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I. INTRODUCTION
In Miranda v. Arizona, I the Supreme Court attempted to amel-
iorate the "inherently coercive" nature of custodial interrogation.2
The Court reasoned that by extending certain fifth amendment pro-
tections3 to the interrogation room, the coercive atmosphere would
be significantly reduced. Miranda's loophole, however, was its pro-
vision that suspects could be interrogated if they made a "knowing
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. Id. at 458.
3. Miranda held that the fifth amendment's self-incrimination clause requires that a
person undergoing custodial interrogation be informed of his right to silence, as well as his
right to the presence of counsel, either retained or appointed, during interrogation. Id. at 444-
45.
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and intelligent" waiver of their fifth amendment rights.' In practice,
most suspects do waive their Miranda rights,' and, as a result, inter-
rogation proceeds much as it did before Miranda. Consequently,
Miranda's goal of reducing the coercive atmosphere inherent in cus-
todial interrogation has not been realized.6 The spirit of Miranda
thus requires that other, more effective, steps be taken to alleviate
the coercive nature of interrogation.
Trickery is an especially coercive interrogation technique.' Be-
cause trickery has its harshest effect upon innocent persons,8 and,
4. Id. at 444. See also F. GRAHAM, THE SELF INFUCTED WOUND 182 (1970).
5. See Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's
Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1347, 1394-95 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as D.C. STUDY]; Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda,
76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1563, 1577-78, 1613-16 (1967) [hereinafter cited as NEW HAVEN STUDY].
These two studies, although dated, remain the major empirical studies on the effect of
Miranda, and frequent reference will be made to them. See also Witt, Non-Coercive Interro-
gation and the Administration of Criminal Justice: The Impact of Miranda on Police
Effectuality, 64 J. Cam. L.C. & P.S. 320, 325-26, 331 (1973). For a discussion of several
empirical studies, including the New Haven and D.C. Studies, see 0. STEPHENS, THE SUPREME
COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 168-78 (1973).
6. See D. C. STUDY, supra note 5, at 1394; 0. STEPHENS, supra note 5, at 200. Stephens
believes that the primary benefit of Miranda has been its "educational" value. Id.
7. The Miranda Court recognized this in its condemnation of trickery used to obtain a
waiver. See 384 U.S. at 453, 476. Miranda, however, did not expressly prohibit the use of
trickery after a waiver, nor have the courts interpreted it in that manner. See text accompany-
ing notes 146-52 infra. Very little psychological literature on the subject of interrogation is
available, probably because the police conduct most interrogations in complete privacy. The
major psychological work in the area is Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of
Coercion, 82 HARv. L. REv. 42 (1968). In that article Professor Driver catalogued the socio-
psychological pressures focused against the suspect undergoing interrogation even after
Miranda, and concluded that "[t]he Miranda warnings failed to provide safeguards against
the social psychological rigors of duress and interrogation, except to the extent that they
prevent interrogation altogether." Id. at 59. Although the article does not contain any specific
discussion of trickery and its effect on interrogation, Professor Driver does conclude that the
interrogator's "air of confidence" in the suspect's guilt is an important factor in inducing a
suspect to confess. Id. at 55-56. This suggests that any technique in which the police falsely
confront a suspect with evidence of his guilt would have a powerful effect.
Professor Milton Horowitz addressed this point in The Psychology of Confession, 47 J.
CmM. L.C. & P.S. 197 (1956). He pinpointed five conditions that induced a suspect to make
a confession: (1) an accusation by authorities; (2) evidence of guilt presented to the suspect;
(3) the reduction of friendly forces; (4) the suspect's feeling that he is guilty; and (5) the
suspect's feeling that confession is the path to psychological freedom. Id. at 204. Horowitz
hypothesizes in regard to the second condition that when a person perceives that actual
evidence backs the accusation of authority, his psychological position becomes very preca-
rious. Id. at 202. The article does not discuss police trickery specifically, but Professor Horo-
witz' emphasis on the important role that confrontation with evidence plays in obtaining a
confession certainly suggests the coercive potential in deceptive police tactics.
8. In his 1956 article Professor Horowitz briefly discusses the effect of interrogation on
innocent persons who have nothing to confess. He observes that "[e]ven innocent persons
placed under a cloud of accusation, feel apprehension or anxiety, and, sometimes guilt."
Driver, supra note 7, at 203. Although he does not discuss the plight of the innocent person
in detail, Horowitz' observation suggests that the innocent suspect's feelings of anxiety and
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because Miranda apparently has not curtailed its use, this Note
submits that the law should pursue effective means of curbing this
practice. For purposes of this Note, trickery is defined as any police
attempt to confront a suspect with evidence of his guilt when no
such evidence exists.'
In sum, this Note maintains that trickery can be effectively
curtailed despite the failure of Miranda to do so. This Note argues
that trickery in the interrogation room is a violation of fourteenth
amendment substantive due process. 0 The Supreme Court has re-
cently stated, in very unambiguous terms, that due process require-
ments exist independently of the fifth amendment Miranda require-
ments in the interrogation context." This Note therefore proposes
an objective due process standard that would prohibit trickery. The
violation of this due process standard would require the exclusion
at trial of confessions induced by trickery. Because the exclusionary
rule is not a sufficient sanction against willful police misconduct,
however, this Note also argues that a tort remedy should be avail-
able to innocent persons victimized by a police trickery.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND TO MODERN CONFESSION LAW' 2
A. Miranda v. Arizona
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court "revolutionized"
modern confession law by holding in Miranda v. Arizona" that the
guilt make it more difficult for him to assert his innocence.
This inference receives support from Professor Inbau of Northwestern University Law
School, co-author of F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS (2d ed.
1967), and a noted advocate of the policeman's perspective on confession law. For a general
introduction to Inbau's life and work, see the tribute to him in 68 J. Cam. L.C. & P.S., iii,
iii-197 (1977). Professor Inbau admits that in presenting an innocent suspect with accusations
of guilt "he may become so disturbed and confused that it will be more difficult . . . to
ascertain the fact of the subject's innocence or even to obtain possible clues or helpful infor-
mation which might otherwise have been obtainable." F. INBAU & J. REID, supra, at 92. If
the mere accusation of guilt has such adverse effects, one may reasonably surmise that an
actual confrontation with "proof" will greatly exacerbate the suspect's psychological disturb-
ance.
9. This definition of trickery, as well as its more common manifestations, will be dis-
cussed in Part V infra. This Note recognizes that other forms of police misconduct that do
not fit this definition could be generally classified as "trickery," but they are beyond the scope
of this Note.
10. See text accompanying notes 215-31 infra.
11. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 396-402 (1978).
12. For an excellent discussion of the evolution of American confession law, see Dix,
Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, and the Modem Law of Confessions, 1975 WASH.
U.L.Q. 275, 279-300. For an in-depth treatment of this area, see 0. STEPHENS, supra note 5,
at 17-119; Developments in the Law - Confessions, 79 HARv. L. REv. 935, 954-96 (1966).
13. The word is borrowed from Y. KAMIsA, W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 519 (4th ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as CRIMINAL PROCEDURE].
14. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment,'" applied to the
states through the fourteenth amendment, guarantees certain rights
to the citizen undergoing "custodial interrogation" by a governmen-
tal police agency." As a result of Miranda, the suspect has the right
to remain silent and, more significantly, the right to the presence
of counsel during interrogation itself." In addition, the fifth amend-
ment entitles indigent suspects to appointed counsel.'" From the
perspective of police practice, Miranda's significance lay not so
much in its recognition of these rights as in its constitutional re-
quirement that the police affirmatively inform the suspect of his
rights before questioning." Moreover, no questioning may begin un-
less the suspect makes a "knowing and intelligent" waiver of his
rights. 20
Miranda can be described as revolutionary because it held that
these rights are grounded in the fifth amendment's guarantee
against self-incrimination. 2 1 It had only been two years before, in
Malloy v. Hogan,22 that the Court first held the self-incrimination
clause applicable to state criminal proceedings. Miranda's recogni-
tion of the constitutional basis of the individual's right to silence
during interrogation was not entirely original. In Escobedo v.
Illinois,23 decided in 1964, the Court held that the sixth amend-
ment's right to counsel guaranteed the individual's right to absolute
silence in the face of police questioning. Miranda, however, took the
long step of requiring24 the police to inform the suspect of this right,
or else the subsequent confession would be inadmissible at trial.25
Of far greater constitutional significance was Miranda's holding
that the fifth amendment's self-incrimination clause guarantees the
right to counsel during custodial interrogation. It was this aspect of
the Miranda decision that brought the loudest howls from members
15. The fifth amendment provides in relevant part: "No person . . . shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
16. The self-incrimination clause was applied to interrogations conducted by federal
officers in the early case of Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). Although the invoca-
tion of the fifth amendment in the interrogation context was rather startling, the practical
significance of Bram was limited, since the Court held that the fifth amendment was "but a
crystallization" of common law confession doctrines. Id. at 543; see Dix, supra note 12, at
289.
17. 384 U.S. at 444.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. For a second summary of the Court's holding, see id. at 478-79.
21. Id. at 439.
22. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
23. 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964).
24. 384 U.S. at 476.
25. Id. at 479.
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of the "law and order" community." What these critics failed to
foresee, however, was the astonishingly high rate at which suspects
would waive the fifth amendment rights guaranteed by Miranda."
Indeed, thirteen years later, there is little reason to believe that
Miranda has had any substantial effect upon either the conduct or
the effectiveness of police interrogation.n To some extent this mini-
mal impact may be attributed to subsequent decisions of the Burger
Court limiting the scope of the Miranda protections.2" A more likely
explanation, however, may be the Warren Court's failure to recog-
nize the numerous influences that result in the waiving of rights by
most suspects; for example, the perfunctory, ritualistic manner in
which most officers read off the warnings,o the inability of most
suspects to understand what the warnings really mean,3 1 and even
the basic social and psychological pressures that inherently make it
very difficult for many people to refuse to answer questions.32
Miranda represents the high-water mark" in constitutional pro-
tections accorded the citizen undergoing interrogation. Above all
else, Miranda was a noble attempt to "objectify"34 the test for deter-
mining whether a confession is constitutionally admissible. The old
due process voluntariness standard that preceded Miranda, dis-
cussed at length below, left entirely too much room for subjectivity
and ad hoc judgment." Moreover, the case by case treatment re-
26. See F. GRAHAM, supra note 4, at 183.
27. Id. at 182-84.
28. 0. STEPHENS, supra note 5, at 205. Graham suggests that the "furor" surrounding
Miranda had the beneficial effect of informing the public that people do not have to explain
their activities to the government. He also refers to observers who believe that the frequency
of dragnet arrests, prolonged incommunicado interrogations, and physical brutality has
greatly diminished since Miranda. F. GRAHAM, supra note 4, at 184. With regard to inter-
rogation itself, however, Graham concludes that the Court knew that it had "only dealt a
tap on the wrist" to custodial interrogation. Id. at 183.
29. E.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (limiting the definition of custodial
interrogation); Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (although petitioner had refused to
talk during first interview, statement made two hours later during second interview with
different detective after new Miranda warnings was admissible); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222 (1971) (statements obtained in violation of Mirunda held admissible for impeachment
purposes).
30. See NEW HAVEN STUDY, supra note 5, at 1550-52.
31. See D.C. STUDY, supra note 5, at 1372-75.
32. See Griffith & Ayres, A Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft
Protestors, 77 YALE L.J. 300, 315-18 (1967). This study is particularly interesting because it
involved Yale faculty, graduate students, and undergraduates who had turned in their draft
cards and were subsequently approached by the F.B.I. The study reinforced the original New
Haven Study's conclusion that the Miranda warnings are almost totally ineffective, even
when the suspect is intelligent, and the interrogation is polite and non-custodial. Id. at 318.
33. F. GRAHAM, supra note 4, at 157.
34. Id. at 179, 184; Dix, supra note 12, at 297-98.
35. See Kamisar, A Dissent From the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the
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quired by the voluntariness standard threatened to deluge the Su-
preme Court with confession cases.3 1 Unfortunately, Miranda did
not bring total clarity to the law of confessions. The battleground
merely shifted to the waiver provisions of Miranda.37 The issue be-
came whether a suspect had made a knowing and intelligent waiver
before spilling his story. Once again the courts became entangled in
problems surrounding the suspect's subjective state of mind." This
problem suggests that it is appropriate to re-examine the legal back-
ground of modern confession law in order to determine whether
there are standards that could more easily and objectively be ap-
plied to determine whether a confession meets constitutional re-
quirements.
B. Common Law Evidentiary Requirements-Reliability
Traditionally, American common law" permitted the admis-
sion of a confession into evidence if the prosecution could show that
the confession was reliable. The confession was deemed reliable if
there was no reason to doubt the truth of the statements made
therein. 0 This reliability standard excluded confessions only in the
most extreme circumstances, as when the confession was procured
through the use of torture, threats, or promises." The standard had
a certain amount of superficial appeal; after all, if the court had no
reason to doubt the truth of a particular -statement, why should it
not be used against the defendant? Wigmore maintained to the end
of his life that this was the only standard by which confessions
should be judged. 42
Because many forms of coercion would not be classified as
threats or promises, this approach allowed the police very broad
freedom in conducting an interrogation. For example, this standard
"New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test, 65 MIcH. L. REV. 59, 94-104
(1966).
36. Dix, supra note 12, at 295; F. GRAHAM, supra note 4, at 179.
37. Note, Deceptive Interrogation Techniques and the Relinquishment of Constitu-
tional Rights, 10 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 109 (1978).
38. See Dix, supra note 12, at 314-24.
39. For a discussion of the English common law regarding confessions, see Dix, supra
note 12, at 279-85.
40. See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 822 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
41. See Note, supra note 37, at 112-14.
42. See 3 WIGMORE, supra note 40, at § 822. Wigmore's view still has a considerable
number of supporters, the most notable of whom is probably Professor Inbau. The following
is Inbau's "rule of thumb" for determining a confession's admissibility, as viewed by a police
officer. "Is what I am about to do, or say, apt to make an innocent person confess?" Inbau
believes that this test still satisfies constitutional requirements, once a suspect has waived
his Miranda rights. F. INHAU & J. REID, supra note 8, at 163.
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would have permitted the prosecution to use a statement that had
been obtained after thirty-six consecutive hours of questioning,
since an innocent person presumably has no more reason to confess
after thirty-six hours than he would after one." Thus, because the
reliability test neither reflected concern for innocent persons sub-
jected to such abuse nor recognized that allowing police to "break"
a guilty suspect into confessing runs counter to our society's sense
of justice, the Supreme Court gradually developed constitutional
limits on the tactics that police could use in interrogation, regard-
less of the truthworthiness of the confession those tactics produced.
C. Constitutional Limits-The Voluntariness Test
In 1936, in Brown v. Mississippi," the Supreme Court held for
the first time that a confession was inadmissible in a state court on
fourteenth amendment due process grounds. The Court found the
torture used to extract the confessions in Brown so revolting that it
offended fundamental principles of justice. 5 Since the coerced con-
fessions in Brown were clearly unreliable," Brown actually went no
further then to establish the trustworthiness test as a minimum
requirement of fourteenth amendment due process," In the years
after Brown, however, the Court began to indicate that due process
required something more than a showing that the particular confes-
sion at issue was reliable. For example, in 1941 Justice Roberts,
writing for a majority of the Court in Lisenba v. California," stated
that "[t]he aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude
presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfair-
ness in the use of evidence, whether true or false."" Three years
later, in Ashcraft v. Tennessee,"o the Court overturned on due pro-
cess grounds a conviction based on a confession obtained after
thirty-six hours of questioning, even though there was no reason to
doubt the trustworthiness of the particular statement at issue.'
Ashcraft signalled the beginning of a due process
''voluntariness" test that focused on the fundamental fairness of
43. See Justice Jackson's dissent in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 156 (1944).
44. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
45. Id. at 286.
46. For example, a deputy sheriff in Brown, after severely whipping one of the defen-
dants, declared that he would continue the whippings until the suspect confessed, whereupon
the defendant agreed to make a statement. Id. at 282-83.
47. See Note, supra note 37, at 114.
48. 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
49. Id. at 236.
50. 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
51. Id. at 156 (Jackson, J., dissenting); CamiWAL PROCEDURE, supra note 13, at 511.
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police interrogation methods and the effect of those methods on the
will of the suspect.52 Two cases from the 1950's, Leyra v. Denno,"3
and Spano v. New York," applied the new standards to situations
involving more subtle forms of psychological coercion. In Leyra, the
police sent a physician to treat Leyra's sinus condition. Unknown
to Leyra, the physician, a Dr. Helfand, was actually a highly-skilled
psychiatrist employed by the police to extract a statement from
Leyra. Dr. Helfand achieved notable success in this regard.'- The
Court found that Leyra's ability to resist interrogation, already
weakened by his physical and emotional exhaustion after days and
nights of intermittent questioning, was "broken to almost trance-
like submission by use of the arts of a highly skilled psychiatrist."',
The admission of such a confession, the Court held, was inconsistent
with due process. The reliability of Leyra's incriminating state-
ments was not questioned.
Five years later, in Spano v. New York, 5 the Court held inad-
missible a murder confession obtained by exploiting Spano's friend-
ship with a police officer named Bruno. Bruno, at the behest of his
superiors, led Spano to believe that if he did not confess to Bruno,
officer Bruno would lose his job. Officer Bruno naturally pointed out
the adverse consequences unemployment would have on his preg-
nant wife and three small children. Spano, a young, uneducated
immigrant with a history of emotional disturbance, had been ques-
tioned for eight hours before finally breaking down in the face of
Bruno's emotional coercion. The Court emphasized officer Bruno's
ruse in holding Spano's statement involuntary and therefore inad-
missible." Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion emphasized the
irrelevance of a confession's reliability for the purposes of the volun-
tariness test."' The Chief Justice further stated that the recent con-
fession cases suggested that the police bore an increasing burden "in
protecting fundamental rights of our citizenry," a burden that could
only increase as police officers became more responsible and the
methods used to extract confessions more sophisticated.10
52. See, e.g., Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S.
49 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949). (All three cases involved confessions
whose trustworthiness was not seriously disputed).
53. 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
54. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
55. See 347 U.S. at 562-84 (transcript of Dr. Helfand's interrogation of Leyra).
56. Id. at 561.
57. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
58. Id. at 318-24.
59. Id. at 320-21.
60. Id. at 321.
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If doubt remained as to whether the common law reliability test
was a part of the emerging fourteenth amendment voluntariness
test, Rogers v. Richmond" dispelled it. 2 In Rogers, decided in 1961,
the Court held unequivocally that a trial court could not consider
the probable truth or falsity of a confession in determining the vol-
untariness of the statement under the due process clause.3 The
proper question to ask, the Court explained, is whether the behavior
of the police overbore the suspect's will to resist and brought about
a confession "not freely self-determined.""
The voluntariness standard that emerged from Rogers v.
Richmond-whether or not the suspect's will was overborne so that
his confession was not freely self-determined-obviously required
clarification. Justice Frankfurter attempted to delineate the
"principles" of the voluntariness test in his plurality opinion in
Culombe v. Connecticut," but his sixty-seven page effort satisfied
neither the Court" nor the academicians." Justice Frankfurter
listed a number of "factors" and "surrounding circumstances" that
were relevant in determining the voluntariness of a confession. He
concluded, however, that there was no "single litmus-paper test for
constitutionally impermissible interrogations;"" the "ultimate
test" remained: "Is the confession the product of an essentially free
and unconstrained choice by its maker?"" Professor Kamisar, in a
major criticism of this standard"o concluded that "involuntariness"
was little more than a fiction used to vilify certain interrogation
methods, while "voluntariness" was little more than a fiction de-
signed to beautify certain other interrogation techniques."
In 1963, the Supreme Court itself seemed to lend considerable
support to Professor Kamisar's criticism in the case of Haynes v.
61. 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
62. In Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960), Chief Justice Warren had empha-
sized that "there are considerations which transcend the question of guilt or innocence," id.
at 206, but the Court did not hold, as in Rogers, that the probability of the confession's truth
was irrelevant in applying the voluntariness test.
63. The Court stated that the question of voluntariness is "to be answered with com-
plete disregard of whether or not petitioner in fact spoke of the truth." 365 U.S. at 544. Of
course, if the confession is probably false, fundamental fairness would require its exclusion.
64. Id.
65. 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
66. Only Justice Stewart actually joined in the Frankfurter opinion. See CRIMINAL PRO-
CmDuRE, supra note 13, at 506 n.b.
67. See Kamisar, What is an "Involuntary" Confession? Some Comments onlnbau and
Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RrrGERS L. REV. 728, 744-46 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Comments].
68. 367 U.S. at 601.
69. Id. at 602.
70. Comments, note 67 supra.
71. Id. at 745-46.
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Washington.7 2 The police held Haynes incommunicado for sixteen
hours and told him that he could not contact his wife until he had
signed a written confession. The Court held that, under the totality
of the circumstances, his resulting written confession was involun-
tary."3 Justice Goldberg, writing for the majority, stated that
[t]he line between proper and permissible police conduct and techniques and
methods offensive to due process is, at best, a difficult one to draw, particu-
larly in cases such as this where it is necessary to make fine judgments as to
the effect of psychologically coercive pressures and inducements on the mind
and will of an accused.74
This statement, in which the Court admits the difficulty, if not the
arbitrariness, of line drawing, appears to acknowledge the accuracy
of Professor Kamisar's criticism.
While Justice Goldberg spoke of the difficulty in drawing lines
between acceptable and unacceptable police conduct in a particular
case, his statement also suggests a more fundamental reason why
the Court's voluntariness standard failed to provide standards that
could be objectively applied by the lower courts with any consist-
ency. As Justice Goldberg expressed it, the test required "fine judg-
ments" about the effect of psychological pressures on the mind of a
particular defendant-a highly subjective standard. Ever since
Leyra v. Denno, 5 the Court had gone out of its way to emphasize
that each case must be decided on its own facts. The catch phrase
became "totality of the circumstances."7 By thus limiting the hold-
ing of each case to its own facts, the Court avoided the necessity of
objectively classifying particular police practices as per se violations
of due process. The vagueness of this standard resulted in a severe
administrative burden on the Supreme Court because the standard
required extensive review of lower courts unable to apply it satisfac-
torily. This burden was a significant factor leading to the Court's
attempt to objectify confession law in Miranda.77 For example,
although Haynes condemns the practice of conditioning a suspect's
right to call his wife on his signing a confession, it does not actually
hold that this practice per se renders the subsequent confession
involuntary. The court instead must look at the totality of the cir-
cumstances, or the "context in which [the confession was] made."7
72. 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
73. Id. at 514.
74. Id. at 515.
75. 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
76. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963).
77. See Dix, supra note 12, at 294-97; CRnmmA, PROCEDURE, supra note 13, at 513
(quoting from Justice Black's remarks during the Miranda oral arguments).
78. 373 U.S. at 514.
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Presumably this approach leaves open the possibility that in other
circumstances, a court might not find a confession involuntary, even
though the police had told the suspect that he could not contact
anyone until he confessed.
This Note submits that the Court developed the totality of the
circumstances test as a means for simply expressing its judgment
that in a given case the police misconduct actually caused the de-
fendant to confess against his will. It is illuminating to note that the
phrase developed in cases in which the defendant was a "more sus-
ceptible subject"" than the average person would have been. In
Fikes v. Alabama,"o in 1956, the Court first used the phrase "totality
of the circumstances."" The petitioner in Fikes was an uneducated
black of low mentality, perhaps mentally ill.82 Viewing the "totality
of the circumstances," the Court emphasized the weakness and sus-
ceptibility of Fikes in holding the confession involuntary. 3 By con-
trast, in Crooker v. California" the Court placed great weight on the
petitioner's college education and one year of law school as part of
the "sum total of the circumstances" in holding that Crooker's con-
fession had been voluntary.85 On the other hand, in Blackburn v.
Alabama," the Court relied almost entirely on Blackburn's alleged
insanity at the time of his confessions in determining that the con-
fession was involuntary, even though the other "pertinent circum-
stances," objectively viewed, were less offensive than those in
Crooker.87 Similarly, in Spano v. New York" the Court emphasized
79. The phrase is from Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957). As Justice Clark
suggested in his Haynes dissent, the Court's confession cases "ordinarily dealt" with the
"mentally sub-normal accused," the "youthful offender" or the "naive and impressionable
defendant." 373 U.S. at 522.
80. 352 U.S. 191 (1956).
81. Id. at 197. Of course, the concept of examining the circumstances surrounding the
confession in each case existed long before the Court started using this particular phrase. For
example, in 1949, in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949), the Court had referred to "the
total situation out of which [the defendant's] confessions came." And in Leyra v. Denno,
347 U.S. 556, 558 (1954), the Court spoke of "the circumstances surrounding the confessions."
82. 352 U.S. at 196.
83. Id. at 196-98. The Court quoted from Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 185 (1953):
"The limits in any case depend upon a weighing of the circumstances or pressure against the
power of resistance of the person confessing. What could be overpowering to the weaker will
or mind might be utterly ineffective against an experienced criminal." Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S.
433, 433-34 (1961), emphasized the subnormal mental capacity of the petitioner, as well as
his "illness, pain, and lack of food" in holding that his confession had been involuntary.
84. 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
85. Id. at 438.
86. 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
87. Crooker had expressly requested and been denied an opportunity to contact his
attorney on at least two occasions before making his confession. 357 U.S. at 436. In Blackburn,
by contrast, the main "pertinent circumstance," aside from Blackburn's insanity, was the
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Spano's youth, lack of education, and emotional instability in find-
ing his confession involuntary."
One way of explaining the Court's emphasis on the suspect's
subjective weaknesses in these cases is that these weaknesses serve
to exacerbate the level of police abuse. The problem with this ex-
planation, however, is that it suggests that the Court was in effect
requiring police to categorize suspects before subjecting them to
various interrogation techniques. In other words, police were to treat
suspects of subnormal intelligence more delicately than those of
average or above-average intelligence. Nothing in the Court's opin-
ions, however, suggests that this is in fact what was being required.
Indeed, nowhere in Fikes, Spano, or Blackburn does the Court sug-
gest that the interrogators had even been aware of the suspect's
weaknesses.
This Note instead submits that the Cpurt's interest in the sus-
pect's individual weaknesses in these cases arose because the
heightened susceptibility of a particular suspect assured the Court
that the police abuse in question actually caused the suspect to
confess against his will. This analysis is profered despite Professor
Kamisar's criticism that the voluntariness standard was an arbi-
trary means of distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable police
practices. 0
Rather than reach an arbitrary decision, the Court went out of
its way when applying the voluntariness test to demonstrate that
the questionable police practice at issue was the immediate cause
of the resulting confession. This conclusion is evidenced by the
Court's detailed discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the
petitioners in each case. In none of the thirty-five confession cases
preceding Miranda did the Court nullify confessions simply because
of a particular form of police abuse. In each case the Court carefully
established the causal link, or lack thereof, between the police mis-
conduct and the resulting confession."
eight to nine hours of interrogation. See 361 U.S. at 207. It does not appear that Blackburn
had ever requested to contact anyone during his detention, although the Court noted the
absence of Blackburn's friends, relatives, or legal counsel as another circumstance suggesting
the involuntariness of the confession. Id.
88. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
89. See notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text.
90. See Comments, supra note 67, at 745-46.
91. See Justice Brennan's concurrence in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 799
(1970): "Even after the various meanings of 'involuntary' have been identified, application
of voluntariness criteria in particular circumstances remains an illusofy process because it
entails judicial evaluation of the effect of particular external stimuli upon the state of mind
of the accused." Id. at 803 (emphasis added). Although Brady involved the voluntariness of
a guilty plea, it is clear that Justice Brennan's observation regarding involuntariness applies
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This Note thus suggests that what the Court was really doing
in the voluntariness cases was first, identifying an abuse of the
interrogation process, and second, determining that the abuse was
the direct cause of the subsequent confession. When the Court found
that an abuse had caused the confession, it deemed the resulting
confession "involuntary." The phrase "totality of the circumstan-
ces" simply became the Court's shorthand way of saying that it had
found a causal link between the abuse and the confession."
One reason why the Court, whether consciously or intuitively,
expressed its causation finding in terms of the totality of the circum-
stances could well be that it would have been awkward to explicitly
make a completely de novo finding as to the petitioner's state of
mind. It is interesting to note, however, that the Court could have
made such an independent evidentiary determination in a case al-
leging violation of due process.93 Nevertheless, by invoking the
"totality" test in these cases, the Court maintained its appearance
as an appellate body, even though in reality the Court had found
as a factual matter that the petitioner had been coerced into con-
fessing.
The voluntariness test has been soundly criticized as an
"ineffective" and "inadequate"" means of determining a confes-
sion's admissibility. Indeed, the Miranda opinion itself is indisputa-
ble evidence that the Court has recognized the unworkability of this
standard. The fundamental flaw in this standard is its extreme
subjectivity; any test based almost exclusively on a particular indi-
vidual's state of mind could not possibly serve as an effective legal
standard. The "totality of the circumstances" test of voluntariness
required exactly this sort of subjective inquiry to determine whether
the police misconduct at issue had actually caused the confession
in question. This Note submits, however, that the Court should not
have felt compelled to find an actual causal link between the police
behavior and the confession in question, but should have instead
ruled that certain interrogation tactics were so unfair as to render
the confession violative of due process per se. For example, in
Haynes v. State,5 the Court could have held that police refu-
sal to allow the suspect to make a phone call rendered the confes-
equally to confessions, because the case he cites in support of his statement is Haley v. Ohio,
332 U.S. 596 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), a confession case.
92. Cf. Justice Frankfurter's observation that "a complex of values underlies this stric-
ture against use . . . of involuntary confessions which, by way of convenient shorthand, this
Court terms involuntary." 361 U.S. at 207.
93. Haynes v. State, 373 U.S. 503, 515-16 (1963).
94. Kamisar, supra note 35, at 109; Dix, supra note 12, at 296.
95. 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
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sion violative of due process. In Spano, the Court could have found
that the deceptive use of Officer Bruno, in and of itself, resulted in
an invalid confession. Similarly, the Court in Fikes could have ruled
that five days of incommunicado interrogation invalidated the con-
fession. Thus if the Court had used, due process to vilify certain
techniques, a due process standard might have emerged that would
have served as a more effective means of controlling police miscon-
duct."
III. THE DUE PROCESS STANDARD AFTER Miranda: A PROPOSED
OBJECTIVE STANDARD
In Miranda, the Court applied the fifth amendment in a way
that it had never been applied before. The Court held that a certain
type of police misconduct, failure to give the required warnings or
interrogation without a valid waiver, would result in an inadmissi-
ble confession, regardless of the suspect's subjective mental condi-
tion." Miranda was the Court's magnificent attempt to objectify
modern confession law." Although critics cheered the death of the
due process voluntariness standard," the standard did not die with
Miranda as its critics had hoped.100 Instead, the Court strikingly
reaffirmed the independent viability of the voluntariness standard
in the 1978 case of Mincey v. Arizona.10
In Mincey the suspect's incriminating statements concerning
the murder of a police officer were obtained from him while he was
under treatment in the intensive care unit of a Tucson hospital for
wounds received in a shoot-out. Although the interrogating detec-
tive informed Mincey of his Miranda rights, the interrogation con-
tinued despite Mincey's repeated requests that the questions stop
until he could get a lawyer.102 While the prosecution did not attempt
96. An "objective" standard for determining voluntariness is not unheard of. Judge
Weinstein has applied an objective standard, as well as a separate subjective test, for deter-
mining whether a guilty plea is involuntary. United States v. Mancusi, 275 F. Supp. 508, 515-
16 (E.D.N.Y. 1967). The objective test would invalidate any plea when threats or promises
have been made to the defendant, regardless of whether they actually "overwhelmed" him.
The purpose of this objective standard is to deter official impropriety. Id. at 516.
97. 384 U.S. at 468-69.
98. See Dix, supra note 12, at 297; F. GAHAM, supra note 4, at 184.
99. See Kamisar, supra note 35.
100. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), made it clear that due process require-
ments co-existed with the Miranda requirements. The Court held in Harris that a statement
obtained in violation of Miranda and therefore inadmissible as part of the prosecution's case
in chief could be used to impeach the defendant so long as "the trustworthiness of the
evidence satisfies legal standards." Id. at 422. The Court elaborated on Harris in Oregon v.
Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 720-24 (1975).
101. 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
102. Id. at 396.
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to use Mincey's statement in its case-in-chief at trial,'"' it did use
Mincey's statements for impeachment purposes when he took the
stand."' The Court held that such use of Mincey's statements was
impermissible because the statements were involuntary. As Justice
Stewart stated, "any criminal trial use against a defendant of his
involuntary statement is a denial of due process of law, 'even though
there is ample evidence aside from the confession to support the
conviction.' "105
Thus Mincey clearly shows that it is legally possible to raise
both a fifth amendment Miranda and a due process voluntariness
challenge to the admissibility of a confession. 06 A defendant who
has made a valid waiver of his Miranda rights may still challenge
his confession's voluntariness on due process grounds.0 7 As a practi-
cal matter, however, such a challenge currently has little chance of
success because the old voluntariness test has become the standard
for determining the validity of a Miranda waiver. 08 As a result, a
determination that the waiver was valid necessarily implies that the
ensuing confession was voluntary."' This effectively amounts to an
irrebuttable presumption that a confession is voluntary once a valid
Miranda waiver is found. This presumption makes it virtually im-
possible for a defendant to convince a court that his confession was
involuntary regardless of the coerciveness of the police conduct fol-
lowing the waiver. When one also considers the rather relaxed stan-
dards that have come to be applied in determining validity of
Miranda waivers,"10 the ultimate irony of Miranda may well be that
the police are freer to use coercive tactics now than they were before
that landmark decision. This hypothesis suggests the necessity of
103. The prosecutor stipulated that he would use Mincey's statements only to impeach
him, as allowed by Harris, and therefore the possible Miranda violation became irrelevant.
Id. at 397 n.12.
104. Id. at 397. The trial court, relying on Harris and Hass, found that Mincey's state-
ments were voluntary and therefore could be used for impeachment. See note 100 supra.
105. 437 U.S. at 398, quoting Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376 (1964).
106. Mincey, for example, had originally challenged the admissibility of his statements
on both Miranda and voluntariness grounds, but the prosecutor's stipulation that he would
not use the statements in the state's case mooted the Miranda challenge. See 437 U.S. at 397
n.12.
107. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 592 F.2d 1139, 1141-42 (10th Cir. 1979).
108. See Dix, supra note 12, at 300; Note, supra note 37, at 117-18.
109. Apparently no reported cases exist in which a court has found that a confession
satisfied the Miranda requirements but nonetheless was involuntary on due process grounds.
Cf. United States v. Scott, 592 F.2d 1139 (10th Cir. 1979) (rejecting defendant's claim that
government must show voluntariness of his statement; no argument that statement was
obtained in violation of Miranda).
110. See Dix, supra note 12, at 314 ("[T]he courts have been unreceptive to arguments
that waivers are invalid when the defendant fails to understand his rights after being given
the Miranda warnings."); Note, supra note 37, at 117-18 (1978).
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developing a new due process standard to cope with police abuses
that have continued to flourish since Miranda.
Although, as Mincey unmistakably shows, Miranda did not
spell the end of the voluntariness standard in confession cases,
Miranda did spell its death in another sense. After Miranda, the
Supreme Court ceased to develop the content of the voluntariness
doctrine."' The Court's surprisingly strong reaffirmance in Mincey
of the due process voluntariness standard, however, calls for a reex-
amination of the standard so that future application of the due
process clause will not suffer from the same problems encountered
in the past. A new due process standard could be a useful weapon
in curbing police misconduct left untouched by Miranda without
significantly hampering the legitimate law enforcement interest in
custodial interrogation. Thus, in this light, this Note proposes that
the courts should apply a revised due process test that does not
require consideration of the subjective peculiarities of a particular
defendant. The courts should invoke the doctrine to prohibit objec-
tively identifiable forms of police misconduct. 2 This Note contends
that certain deceptive interrogation techniques qualify as the first
victims of this new due process standard.
IV. TRIcKERY AND THE COURTS
For the purposes of this Note, trickery is defined as any police
attempt to confront a suspect undergoing interrogation with evi-
dence of his guilt when no such evidence exists. This Note identifies
111. Only a few post-Miranda cases deal with the voluntariness issue in a confession
context; all of these cases arose from pre-Miranda trials, so that the voluntariness standard
is the only applicable test. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), held that Miranda
would be applied only to trials begun after the date on which the Miranda decision was
announced; thus petitioners whose trials were conducted before Miranda could only raise
voluntariness objections to the admissibility of their confessions. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394
U.S. 731 (1969); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478 (1969); Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S.
519 (1968); Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967); Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967);
Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966).
Another group of cases deals with the issue of voluntariness as it relates to the question
of whether a statement obtained in violation of Miranda can be admitted for impeachment.
These cases hold that a statement obtained in violation of Miranda may be used for impeach-
ment purposes, but an involuntary statement may not be used for any purpose whatsoever.
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-98 (1978); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975);
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971). None of these cases, however, significantly
developed the standard for voluntariness.
112. See note 96 supra. The especially vulnerable defendant should still have his subjec-
tive infirmities considered in any voluntariness determination, whether in the context of a
confession or guilty plea. For example, a statement obtained from a defendant while he was
heavily drugged would probably be involuntary, regardless of the officer's knowledge. This
Note proposes, however, that no subjective consideration is necessary when certain objec-
tively identifiable types of police misconduct have occurred.
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four such techniques that fit this definition: (1) confronting a sus-
pect with the "confession" of his accomplice when there is no such
confession-the "accomplice confession ploy"; (2) confronting a
suspect with a false claim that there is hard physical evidence
against him, such as his fingerprints at the scene of the crime; (3)
falsely telling a suspect that there is an eye-witness who saw him
commit the crime; and (4) subjecting a suspect to a. staged identifi-
cation procedure in which he is picked out as the culprit."3 Under
American common law, confessions induced by the use of such
trickery were admissible because it was assumed that there was no
risk of unreliability in such statements.114 The emergence of the
constitutional voluntariness standard did not significantly change
judicial treatment of such confessions, perhaps because the Su-
preme Court never squarely addressed the issue of whether a confes-
sion induced by trickery was involuntary."5
The Court's closest brush with the trickery problem came in
Frazier v. Cupp,"' decided in 1969. In Frazier the police had used
the accomplice confession ploy on the petitioner, apparently with-
out success."' The petitioner attempted to claim that the confession
later obtained from him was involuntary, citing the police deception
as one of the circumstances that made it so. The Court responded
that "[t]he fact that the police misrepresented the statements that
Rawls [the accomplice] had made is, while relevant, insufficient
in our view to make this otherwise voluntary confession inadmissi-
113. Other interrogation techniques may exist that fit the general definition but would
not be classified under one of these four specific techniques. If such techniques do exist, the
same analysis would almost certainly prohibit their use.
114. See Note, supra note 37, at 119-20.
115. See Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful Analysis, 55 TEx.
L. REv. 193, 201 (1977). In Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949), the Court mentioned
that the police falsely told Turner that the other suspects had "opened up" on him, but the
Court did not emphasize this circumstance in finding Turner's statement involuntary. Id. at
64.
Twelve years later, Justice Clark, dissenting in Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 448 (1961),
relied heavily on the deception practiced in Turner in his attempt to distinguish Turner from
Reck. Justice Clark stated:
In Turner, however, the petitioner "was falsely told that other suspects had 'opened up'
on him." Such a falsification, in my judgment, presents a much stronger case for relief
because at the outset Pennsylvania officers resorted to trickery. Moreover, such a psy-
chological artifice tends to prey upon the mind, leading its victim to either resort to
counter-charges or to assume that "further resistance [is] useless," and abandonment
of claimed innocence the only course to follow.
Id. at 453. Justice Clark was no friend of petitioners presenting claims of involuntary confes-
sions. Thus, his condemnation of trickery has special significance.
116. 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
117. Id. at 737-38. Frazier was falsely told that his accomplice, Rawls, had confessed,
but Frazier "still was reluctant to talk."
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ble."" Many courts and commentators have seized this language as
representing the Supreme Court's definitive word on the admissibil-
ity of confessions induced by police trickery.'19
There are a number of sound arguments, however, that support
the conclusion that the Frazier Court's one sentence 2 ' should not be
viewed as a holding that trickery is not sufficiently coercive in and
of itself to render a confession involuntary. First, Frazier's involun-
tariness argument was not a major part of his petition. Because the
case, although decided after Miranda, arose in the interlude be-
tween Escobedo v. Illinoisl21 and Miranda, Frazier based his main
argument on the police denial of his request to see an attorney.
Frazier argued that this refusal violated his sixth amendment right
to counsel as enunciated in Escobedo.'" It was only as part of this
argument that Frazier added: "the record also presents a general
question of voluntariness under the Fifthand Fourteenth Amend-
ments."'n Frazier's brief devotes only three sentences to the argu-
ment that the confession of Frazier's accomplice was a "deliberate
misrepresentation." 24 Several paragraphs later, the brief concludes
that "[mjoreover, the record in this case shows not only a violation
of Escobedo's principles, but also that Frazier's confession was in-
duced by the police by deliberate factual misrepresentations and
psychological coercion, making the confession involuntary and inad-
missible under well-established Fifth and Fourteenth amendment
principles."' 25 Frazier's involuntariness argument was clearly subor-
dinate to his Escobedo argument.126 It is thus not fair to conclude
that Frazier squarely presented the Court with the question of
whether the misrepresentation rendered the confession involuntary.
118. Id. at 739.
119. See, e.g., Tucker v. State, 549 S.W.2d 285, 288-89 (Ark. 1977); People v. Houston,
36 Ill. App. 3d 695, 702, 344 N.E.2d 641, 646-47 (1976); Hopkins v. State, 19 Md. App. 414,
424, 311 A.2d 483, 488-89 (1973); State v. Stubenrauch, 503 S.W.2d 136, 138 (Mo. Ct. App.
1973); State v. Aguire, 91 N.M. 672, 676, 579 P.2d 798, 800 (1978); Evans v. Commonwealth,
215 Va. 609, 614, 212 S.E.2d 268, 272 (1975); Dix, supra note 12, at 319; Note, supra note 37,
at 120.
120. See text accompanying note 118 supra.
121. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
122. Brief for Petitioner at 30-35. The Court, however, held Escobedo inapplicable to
Frazier's case. 394 U.S. at 739.
123. Brief for Petitioner at 30. Argument II was worded as follows: "Frazier's Confes-
sion, Given After His Request for Counsel Had Been Ignored and After He Had Been Deceived
Into Believing That His Alleged Accomplice Had Incriminated Him, Was Illegally Obtained
and Its Admission Into Evidence Violated His Fifth and Sixth Amendment Rights." Id.
124. Id. at 31.
125. Id. at 34.
126. The involuntariness claim was not even mentioned in the heading of the Argu-
ment. Id. at 30.
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The only case cited in support of Frazier's argument on this point
was Haynes v. Washington,127 in which there was no claim of trick-
ery whatsoever. Second, Frazier's involuntariness argument was
weak under the circumstances because the accomplice ploy appar-
ently was not the cause of Frazier's confession. Frazier began to talk
only after the interrogating officer "sympathetically suggested that
the victim had started the fight by making homosexual advances
. . . .1"28 Last, the State's brief illustrates the relative insignifi-
cance of Frazier's involuntariness argument. In responding to Argu-
ment II of Frazier's brief in which the involuntariness argument
appears, the State's brief does not even mention the deception
issue. 129
Frazier's comment on the use of trickery, that it was merely a
relevant circumstance in determining whether a confession was vol-
untary, seemed particularly significant at the time because in
Miranda the Court clearly had condemned deceptive interrogation
techniques.'30 Perhaps the Miranda Court's strongest indictment of
such practices was its statement that "any evidence that the ac-
cused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of
course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privi-
lege [against self-incrimination]." 3 ' On its face this statement
only prohibited the use of trickery in obtaining a waiver; the Court
did not expressly condemn the use of trickery in an interrogation
following a waiver. The strength of the Court's condemnation of
trickery, however, led some observers to conclude that the Court
had completely outlawed the use of deceptive interrogation tech-
niques.'3 2 It seemed quite logical to conclude that since a trickery-
induced waiver would be deemed involuntary, a trickery-induced
confession should be equally involuntary.' 3 Frazier thus was inter-
preted as a response to such speculation in its apparent statement
127. 373 U.S. 503 (1963), cited in the Brief of Petitioner at 34. A serious involuntariness
argument would certainly have cited Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949), the only
Supreme Court case in which the accomplice confession ploy had led the Court to find a
confession involuntary. See note 115 supra and accompanying text.
128. 394 U.S. at 738.
129. See Brief for Respondent at 16-21.
130. See 384 U.S. at 453, 476.
131. Id. at 476.
132. See A NEw LOOK AT CONFESSIONs: Escobedo - THE SECOND ROUND 75, 237-39 (B.
George, Jr. ed. 1967). This volume contains a very interesting panel discussion on the consti-
tutionality of trickery after Miranda. Id. at 237-39. Judge Skelly Wright, one of the panelists,
concluded that Miranda's effect on the use of trickery after a valid waiver is a gray area. Id.
at 239.
133. Id. at 238. Note especially the statement of Attorney General Lynch of California
that, even though the Court refers only to the obtaining of a waiver, the language condemn-
ing trickery is "all-inclusive." Id.
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that the use of trickery, by itself, is not a basis for excluding a
confession. 34 Indeed, Professor Inbau regards Frazier as a "tacit
approval" of trickery. 3 1 In any event, no reported decision after
Frazier has relied on Miranda's arguably implicit prohibition of
trickery in holding a post-waiver confession inadmissible. 3 1
In the aftermath of Frazier, many state and federal courts have
cited that case for the proposition that police trickery is relevant in
applying the "totality of the circumstances" test to determine
whether a confession was involuntary.' Most of these courts have
then decided that the relevant circumstances did not amount to
involuntariness. Even those courts that expressed displeasure with
police trickery have nevertheless almost invariably decided that
police trickery, even in combination with other police misbehavior,
does not invalidate the resulting confession.13 1
Review of the trickery cases since Frazier reveals that state and
federal courts have used the "totality" language as a shorthand way
of saying that, even though the court disapproves of trickery, it is
simply not offensive enough to warrant the exclusion of an otherwise
reliable confession. 39 Reliability, in fact, may well be the ultimate
reason why courts rarely exclude confessions induced by trickery,
even though Rogers v. Richmond'40 expressly held that the probable
truth of a confession should not be considered in determining
whether a confession meets the due process voluntariness require-
ment. Lower courts have had great difficulty adhering to that prin-
ciple in applying the voluntariness test.' The case most often cho-
sen as an illustration of lower courts' sluggishness in responding to
the Supreme Court's voluntariness standard is Davis v. North
Carolina.'4 2 In Davis the police held the petitioner incommunicado
for sixteen days. There was even a notation on his arrest sheet that
134. See Dix, supra note 115, at 201.
135. Inbau, Legally Permissible Criminal Interrogation Tactics and Techniques, 4 J.
POLICE ScI. & AD. 249, 251 (1976).
136. See Dix, supra note 12, at 319.
137. See cases cited at note 119 supra.
138. See People v. Houston, 36 Ill. App. 3d 695, 702, 344 N.E.2d 641, 647 (1976); People
v. Robinson, 31 A.D.2d 724, 725, 297 N.Y.S.2d 82, 84 (1968). Robinson later obtained federal
habeas corpus relief. Robinson v. Smith, 451 F. Supp. 1278 (W.D.N.Y. 1978). See also text
accompanying notes 147-55 infra for other judicial statements disapproving the use of decep-
tion, including the statement of Judge Curtin, the federal district judge who heard Robinson's
habeas corpus petition.
139. See cases cited at note 119 supra.
140. 365 U.S. 534 (1961); see text accompanying notes 61-64 supra.
141. See Dix, supra note 12, at 306-09; Note, supra note 37, at 114-16.
142. 384 U.S. 737 (1966). Professor Kamisar singles out Davis as a prime example of
the ineffectiveness of the old voluntariness standard. Kamisar, supra note 35, at 99-104.
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he was not to be allowed visitors or the use of the telephone.143
Although the Supreme Court had never sustained the use of a con-
fession obtained after such a lengthy period of detention and inter-
rogation, 14 the North Carolina appellate courts and the lower fed-
eral courts found Davis' confession voluntary. The lower courts pur-
ported to apply the voluntariness standard, but somehow, despite
the patent coerciveness of the Davis circumstances, the courts just
could not bring themselves to suppress an apparently trustworthy
confession. 4 5
An even more unsettling demonstration of lower courts' inabil-
ity to follow Rogers can be seen in recent decisions that have ignored
the voluntariness requirement altogether, and reverted to the com-
mon law reliability standard in determining whether a confession
meets due process requirements. 46 Although this defiance of settled
constitutional law may be startling, these courts deserve commend-
ation for their candor. They could have reached the same result by
applying the totality of the circumstances voluntariness test. In
other words, the vagueness of the totality of the circumstances test
would allow a court to hide behind its smokescreen and deem a
confession voluntary, even though the court's real reason for admit-
ting the confession was its trustworthiness. The lower court deci-
sions in Davis are prime examples of this phenomenon.
Although courts have been reluctant to exclude confessions ob-
tained by trickery on due process grounds, there does appear to be
serious dissatisfaction with deceptive interrogation techniques. For
example, in Robinson v. Smith, "I a 1978 habeas corpus decision of
the United States District Court for the Western District of New
York, the petitioner challenged the voluntariness of the confession
used against him at his 1959 trial on a number of grounds, one of
which was that the confession was involuntary because the police
had used the accomplice confession ploy during interrogation."' The
court found that a detective had falsely told Robinson that his al-
leged accomplice "had accused him of pulling the trigger," and that
the interrogators foisted this phony confession on Robinson "in an
obvious effort to trick him into implicating himself."'"4 Judge Curtin
143. 384 U.S. at 744.
144. Id. at 752.
145. Kamisar, supra note 35, at 101-02.
146. Moore v. Hopper, 389 F. Supp. 931, 934 (M.D. Ga. 1974), aff'd mem., 523 F.2d
1053 (5th Cir. 1975) (held that admission of confession was not error because the deception
was "not calculated to procure an untrue statement"); People v. Felix, 72 Cal. App. 3d 879,
886, 139 Cal. Rptr. 366, 370 (1977).
147. 451 F. Supp. 1278 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
148. Id. at 1291.
149. Id.
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clearly expressed his feelings about such deception as follows: "This
police practice is to be soundly condemned. Such deception clearly
has no place in our system of justice.""'o Although the court listed
several factors in finding that under the totality of the circumstan-
ces Robinson's confession was involuntary, 5 1 the court stated that
"[t]he deception practiced in this case is an important factor that
weighs in petitioner's favor."5 2 Similarly, the Indiana Court of Ap-
peals, confronted with a claim that the police had used the accompl-
ice confession ploy, stated that police trickery is "a factor which
should weigh heavily against a finding of voluntariness."I The ap-
pellate court in Illinois has stated in dictum that "the State has no
right to extort confessions by deliberate fraud or trickery." 4 Eleven
years ago the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia also declared in dictum that garnering a confession by
artifice is no more permissible than achieving the same result by
cruder forms of coercion."15
It is not suggested that these cases represent a substantial
"trend" against the use of trickery in custodial interrogations. The
cases are cited merely to suggest that at least a detectable amount
of judicial disapproval of deceptive interrogation practices exists.
Under the present state of the law, trickery is a "quasi-legal" form
of police behavior. Although courts do not approve of it, and Frazier
dictates that it is a "relevant factor" in a due process claim,"' the
practice does not seem offensive enough to warrant the exclusion of
confessions induced by such trickery. Trickery seems particularly
palatable when an appellate court is dealing with it in the context
of a defendant who has already been convicted and is undoubtedly
guilty of the crime charged. No appellate court, however, has ever
considered that tolerating trickery in the case of an obvious criminal
greatly enhances the likelihood that innocent persons will also be
subjected to deceptive interrogation practices because the police
know that they have nothing to fear by using such techniques. Al-
though it may be true that an innocent person will not confess just
because he is told that a rape victim has identified him,'5 he need
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1292-93.
152. Id. at 1291.
153. Swaney v. State, 374 N.E.2d 554, 556 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978).
154. People v. Smith, 108 Ill. App. 2d 172, 180, 246 N.E.2d 689, 693 (1969).
155. Fuller v. United States, 407 F.2d 1199, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
156. See text accompanying note 118 supra.
157. At least one commentator has seriously questioned whether deceptive interroga-
tion tactics adequately protect the innocent from making false confessions. Weisberg, Police
Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, PouCE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM
153, 165 (C. Sowle ed. 1962).
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not possess a great imagination to be terribly shaken by the experi-
ence.5 8 Thus this Note submits that police trickery raises a number
of fundamental questions that the courts must confront. First, do
the benefits of trickery in the detection of crime outweigh its cost
in terms of the unnecessary anguish it causes innocent persons?
Second, even in the case of a guilty suspect, should the due process
clause sanction such coercive practices? Last, do the benefits of
trickery outweigh the effect its use has on the image of law enforce-
ment officers?
V. POLICE PRACTICES
A. Police View of Interrogation
Before discussing particular deceptive interrogation tech-
niques, it is appropriate to ascertain how the police view the role of
the interrogation process. Because there is little empirical data in
this area, 59 the best indicators of police attitudes remain the
"interrogation manuals" written primarily for police consumption.
The best-known work of this type is Inbau and Reid's Criminal
Interrogation and Confessions.'o The second major work is Aubry
and Caputo's Criminal Interrogation."' Not surprisingly, these au-
thors suggest that the primary function of an interrogation is to
obtain an admission of guilt from a guilty person.1 2 Aubry and
Caputo express this objective in somewhat dramatic terms:
"Generally, [interrogation] techniques might be compared to the
conduct of a military operation in which there is one all-important
objective-the defeat and surrender of the enemy."8 3 It is not sug-
158. Although a person will probably be very distressed simply because he has been
taken into custody for questioning, this Note maintains that a confrontation with "evidence"
of guilt significantly exacerbates the coercive elements of an interrogation. Even Professor
Inbau admits that confronting a suspect with direct accusations of guilt may be so disturbing
that it is difficult to ascertain when a suspect is actually innocent. See note 8 supra. One
might well surmise from this that such accusations in the form of "evidence" of guilt could
be psychologically devastating, even though the suspect is not induced to make a false
confession.
159. The New Haven Study, supra note 5, at 1591-93, contains some data on how police
view the necessity of interrogations. It also contains a survey of detectives' attitudes towards
interrogation after Miranda. Id. at 1610-13.
Professor Stephens' study is probably the most in-depth attempt to gauge police atti-
tudes towards interrogation. 0. STEPHENs, supra note 5, at 179-200.
160. F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note 8. The Miranda Court quoted extensively from the
first edition for examples of extremely coercive interrogation tactics. 384 U.S. 436, 448-54.
161. A. AusaY & R. CAPUTo, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION (1965).
162. Id. at 24.
163. Id. at 97. This statement, in fairness, should be considered in light of Aubry and
Caputo's recommendation that only suspects of certain guilt should be interrogated. See id.
at 77-78.
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gested that it is necessarily wrong for the police to adopt such an
attitude; after all, if a detective truly believes in a suspect's guilt,
he should be diligent in attempting to uncover it. It is maintained,
however, that such diligence must be tempered by limitations on
the forms it may take."
B. A Standard for Determining Intolerable Trickery
"Deceit is inherent in every question asked of the suspect, and
in every statement made by the interrogator.""' It does not follow,
however, that because some level of trickery is inherent in interroga-
tion, that all forms of trickery should be allowed. For example,
although almost everyone would agree that some amount of uninter-
rupted questioning is necessary for effective interrogation, many
persons, including the Supreme Court in Ashcraft v. Tennessee,'
would feel that thirty-six straight hours of questioning is too much.
By analogy, the same principle should apply to trickery; a certain
amount of deception is inevitable, but at some point certain forms
of especially coercive deception should not be tolerated, especially
when they are not indispensable law enforcement weapons. The
problem, of course, is the question of where to draw the line between
permissible and impermissible methods of deception.
This Note submits that intolerable trickery occurs whenever
the police affirmatively confront a suspect with "proof" or
"evidence" of his guilt when no such proof or evidence exists. Intol-
erable techniques include the ploys of falsely telling a suspect that
his accomplice has already implicated him in the crime-the ac-
complice confession ploy; falsely informing a suspect that there is
hard physical evidence, such as fingerprints, linking him to the
crime in question; falsely telling a suspect that there is an eyewit-
ness to his criminal act; and submitting a suspect to a staged identi-
fication procedure in which he is falsely "identified." The test is
whether a reasonable innocent person would feel that he is being
confronted with proof of his guilt. The state of mind of the interro-
gating officer is irrelevant. The trickery is intolerable even if the
officer has a reasonable or honestly mistaken belief that such evi-
dence actually exists. On its face this standard appears to impose
sanctions on negligent police behavior as well as intentional miscon-
164. As Chief Justice Warren stated in Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199,206 (1960):
"[C]oercion can be mental as well as physical, and the blood of the accused is not the only
hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition."
165. F. INBAU & J. REm, supra note 8, at 196. See also A. AusRY & R. CAPuTo, supra
note 161, at 147.
166. 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
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duct. The threat of police perjury, however, supplies the rationale
for this standard. 7 A standard that would allow trickery of suspects
so long as the police are able to fabricate a plausible story demon-
strating a good faith mistake would, unfortunately, supply little
protection at all.
A number of tactics suggested by the police manuals would not
be impermissible by this standard. For example, any technique in
which the officer pretends to "emphathize" with the plight of the
suspect would not be considered intolerable."' This would include
the noted "Mutt and Jeff" or "hot and cold" technique in which one
"friendly" partner sympathizes with the suspect about the way he
is being treated by the "unfriendly" partner.'" In addition, this
standard would not prohibit the police from misleading the suspect
about the nature of the contemplated charge. The most common
example of this technique is to mislead a murder suspect into be-
lieving that the victim of his assault is still alive.7 0 Although this
might appear to fit within the eyewitness ploy, an element of coer-
cion is missing; if the defendant intended to kill the victim, a report
of the victim's survival would presumably come as a relief to the
suspect, since he is already under suspicion. In addition, this tech-
nique would not violate the proposed standard because the reasona-
ble innocent suspect would not believe that the victim's being alive
was proof of his guilt. In fact, it is more likely that the innocent
suspect would be relieved to hear that the victim is alive to clear
him. 7'
The distinction between impermissable techniques that con-
front a suspect with evidence of his guilt and other tolerable forms
of deception is not arbitrary. The standard is based in part on the
167. The problem of police perjury is forcefully articulated by Professor Irving Younger
in The Perjury Routine, THE NATION, May 8, 1967, at 596-97, quoted in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
supra note 13, at 247-48.
168. E.g., Note, supra note 37, at 121-25 (1978). In an extreme case of "empathy" the
suspect may be misled into believing that he is being promised leniency or that his statement
cannot be used against him. If the technique's use rises to that level, any resulting confession
should be barred on that basis. See id. at 125.
For a discussion of various manifestations of the "empathy" technique, see A. AUBRY &
R. CAPUTO, supra note 161, at 79-83.
169. See F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note 8, at 62-64.
170. See, e.g., Collins v. Brierly, 492 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1974); People v. Smith, 108 111.
App. 2d 172, 246 N.E.2d 689 (1969); People v. Solari, 43 A.D.2d 610, 349 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1973).
171. Misrepresentation of the charge is a questionable form of deception, and commen-
tators have argued that a misrepresentation of the charge results in an invalid Miranda
waiver, because the suspect is not given a sufficient basis for making a "knowing and intelli-
gent" waiver. See Dix, supra note 12, at 328-38 & n.217. This appears to be the best approach
to the misrepresentation of the charge problem. The courts, however, have not accepted this
argument. See, e.g., Collins v. Brierly, 492 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1974).
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cat-out-of-the-bag doctrine first enunciated in United States v.
Bayer. 172 The issue in Bayer was whether a confession that followed
an illegally-obtained prior confession could be used against the de-
fendant. If the subsequent confession was the "fruit" of the first
illegal confession, it could not be used. Writing the majority opinion
for the Court, Justice Jackson stated that "after an accused has
once let the cat out of the bag by .confessing . . . he is never there-
after free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of having
confessed. He can never get the cat back in the bag. The secret is
out for good. In such a sense, a later confession always may be
looked upon as the fruit of the first."7 3
Although the "cat" referred to in Bayer is the suspect's own
prior confession, implicit in the Court's statement is a recognition
of the psychological truth174 that once a suspect realizes that hard
evidence against him exists, he may well see no further reason to
resist interrogation. Indeed, to use the traditional formulation, his
will is overborne. It should make no difference whether the "cat" is
the suspect's own confession or some other form of evidence with
which the police confront him; a suspect may be just as coerced by
a false eyewitness report as he would be by his knowledge that he
has already made an incriminating statement. It must be empha-
sized that, according to Bayer, the second confession is inadmissible
not simply because the first confession is illegal, but because the
first confession actually coerces the second one. Of course, if it is
clear that the first confession did not coerce the second confession,
as when a great length of time passes between the two confessions,
the illegality of the first confession becomes irrelevant. On the other
hand, if the first confession is not illegal, a defendant will not be
allowed to argue that his second confession was illegally coerced. It
is interesting to note that the latter result obtains even though the
second confession is likely to be just as involuntary as a confession
following an illegal one. Thus the only distinction is the police mis-
conduct in the case of the prior illegal confession. In short, the cat-
out-of-the-bag doctrine protects against both police misconduct and
coercion such as that which occurs when one confession pressures
the defendant into making further statements. It is important to
note that the cat-out-of-the-bag doctrine comes into play only if
both of those factors are present; the absence of illegality, or the
absence of any apparent connection between the misconduct and
172. 331 U.S. 532 (1947).
173. Id. at 540.
174. See Horowitz, supra note 7, at 204 (emphasizing the importance of a suspect's
belief that there is evidence against him in making his decision to confess).
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the second confession, means that the confession is admissible.
A prohibition against trickery would work in the same way.
Thus a defendant could not complain that the police confronted him
with a truthful eyewitness report identifying him, even though the
pressure brought against him in such a case is as great as the pres-
sure brought to bear when the same story is told but no eyewitness
exists. A defendant has no legal protection against being confronted
with the truth,"' just as he has no protection against being con-
fronted with his prior legal confession. Furthermore, a defendant
cannot complain if there is no apparent coercion as a result of the
trickery. Thus this Note submits that the appropriate approach in
these cases should be that a defendant can claim that his confession
is involuntary only if police confront him with a falsehood, a viola-
tion of fourteenth amendment due process, as proposed below,'
and it reasonably appears that the illegality was coercive. 7
Justice Clark, ordinarily no friend of petitioners in confession
cases, recognized the coercive powers of trickery in his Reck v.
Pate" dissent condemning the accomplice confession ploy:
"[Sluch a psychological artifice tends to prey upon the mind, lead-
ing its victim to either resort to countercharges or to assume that
further resistance [is] useless, and abandonment of claimed inno-
cence the only course to follow." 7 By further implication, a police
representation to an innocent suspect that the "cat is out of the
bag" can only serve to magnify the intensity of that unfortunate
citizen's nightmare, even though he has nothing to confess. The
proposed standard for determining impermissible practices can be
defended on purely practical grounds as a rational means of line
175. Thus a confession induced when an officer mistakenly or accidently confronts a
suspect with actual evidence of his guilt should be admissible. Furthermore, a confession
obtained when an officer thinks he is tricking a suspect by presenting him with false evidence
that in fact exists would be admissible. As a theoretical matter, this distinction based on
truth may not be entirely satisfactory because the officer suffers no penalty for his miscon-
duct. As a practical matter, however, it should be noted that it would be virtually impossible
to prove that an officer intended to trick a suspect with false evidence, when such evidence
actually existed. For example, if an officer "fabricates" an eyewitness when in fact there is
an eyewitness available, he need only produce the eyewitness in order to refute any charge
that he fabricated one.
176. Thus, confrontation with a falsehood is equally illegal as a prior confession ob-
tained in violation of the fifth amendment. Consequently, a confession obtained by trickery
is as tainted as a confession that is the fruit of a prior illegal confession.
177. The standard, however, is strictly an objective one: would a reasonable person
confronted with such evidence conclude that it was no longer possible effectively to assert
his innocence. See text accompanying notes 97-112 supra. The test does not imply that an
innocent person would actually be driven to make a false confession.
178. 367 U.S. 433, 448 (1961).
179. Id. at 453.
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drawing. The pronouncements of Justice Jackson in Bayer and Jus-
tice Clark in Reck v. Pate, however, suggest that there is some legal
basis for the standard as well.
C. Particular Techniques That Violate the Standard
(1) Accomplice Confession Ploy
A number of common police techniques can be identified as
violating the standard proposed herein. For example, Inbau and
Reid discuss the accomplice confession ploy as a part of the more
general tactic called "Play one against the Other." 0 Inbau and
Reid state that there are two principal methods used in playing one
suspect against the other when two or more persons are suspected
of collaborating in a crime. In the first method, the interrogator
merely intimates to one suspect that his accomplice has confessed,' 8'
while in the second method, the detective actually tells the suspect
that the other has confessed and made particular statements in-
criminating the first suspect.18 2 The authors suggest the use of this
technique only as a last resort" because, if the bluff fails and the
guilty suspect realizes that the police have nothing on him, the
entire interrogation becomes useless." Although this implies that
the technique is used rarely, and only on guilty suspects, its status
as a technique of last resort nevertheless means that innocent sus-
pects are likely to be exposed to it, because the police will presuma-
bly feel a need to use their last resorts in an attempt to shake the
innocent suspect's "story." Unlike the guilty suspect, however, the
innocent suspect is not likely to be relieved when he realizes that
the charges against him are unfounded; he already knows that the
police have falsely accused him. His distress results from his inabil-
ity to convince the police of his innocence. The use of the accomplice
ploy only serves to increase his feeling that the police are refusing
to believe him.
The proposed standard would only exclude the more extreme
forms of the "Play one against the Other" technique as described
by Inbau and Reid. The mere "intimation" that a suspect's ac-
complice has implicated him would not be impermissible; indeed it
would be very difficult to avoid conveying that implication in some
180. F. INBAU & J. REm, supra note 8, at 84-91.
181. Id. at 85.
182. Id. at 88-90.
183. Id. at 85.
184. Id. at 90.
185. Id. at 85.
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fashion, at least from the guilty suspect's point of view.' The line
would be drawn, however, at the point where the officer affirma-
tively confronts the suspect with false incriminating written or oral
"statements" from his accomplice. In other words, the test would
be whether a reasonable, innocent suspect would feel that he was
being confronted with evidence of his guilt.187 Such abuse could
cause extreme distress to the innocent suspect because for all he
knows the other suspect may be incriminating him in order to shift
the blame. Moreover, the prohibition of this tactic would probably
not have any detrimental effect on obtaining statements from guilty
suspects. Aubry and Caputo, as well as Inbau and Reid, warn
against the use of "wild guesses" in the practice of this bluff'"
because, once the suspect realizes it, further interrogation will be
fruitless. 8 Thus, the use of completely fabricated statements would
appear to be pointless in the interrogation of many guilty suspects.
On the other hand, if the police are sure enough of the facts to
manufacture an accurate fabricated statement, one might question
why a confession is even necessary.'
(2) Physical Evidence Ploy
Aubry and Caputo suggest the pretense of possessing physical
evidence against the suspect as a "very effective approach" in inter-
rogation."' Inbau and Reid recommend the technique as an effective
means of distinguishing guilty and innocent suspects, 9 2 hypothesiz-
ing that a guilty suspect will attempt to explain away the evidence,
while an innocent suspect will usually make a simple reply asserting
his innocence." 3 One might question the particular effectiveness of
186. For example, even keeping the two suspects in separate cells might suggest to each
of them that the other is talking. Id. at 86-87.
187. The "intimation" techniques suggested by Inbau and Reid (such as confining
accomplices in separate cells) would appear to have value only when the alleged accomplices
are actually guilty. Id. at 85-87. For example, an innocent suspect would have no reason to
feel added distress because his alleged accomplice is confined elsewhere. A technique that is
not coercive in regard to an innocent person is not coercive in the case of a guilty suspect
simply because of the psychological pressures created by the suspect's knowledge of his guilt.
188. Id. at 90; see A. AuBRY & R. CAPUTo, supra note 161, at 122.
189. F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note 8, at 90.
190. The authors of the New Haven Study concluded that interrogation was
"necessary" for conviction in only a relatively small percentage (13%) of the cases they
observed. New Haven Study, supra note 5, at 1581-88. It would seem that if the police have
sufficient evidentiary basis to make an accurate fabrication, they probably have enough
evidence to obtain a conviction.
191. A. Ausav & R. CAPuTo, supra note 161, at 88. The New Haven Study suggests that
this practice is fairly common. See New Haven Study, supra note 5, at 1546.
192. F. INBAU & J. REIm, supra note 8, at 103-04.
193. Id. at 104.
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this technique. It would appear that, by confronting a guilty suspect
with nonexistent evidence, an officer would run a high risk of sug-
gesting to the suspect that the case against him is very weak because
the suspect might know that such evidence is nonexistent. The inno-
cent suspect, on the other hand, could easily imagine that the police
have fabricated evidence against him, or even that he has been
"framed" by a third party.
The proposed standard would prohibit the police from falsely
telling a suspect that there is a particular form of hard evidence
linking him to the crime. It would not prohibit such tactics as show-
ing the suspect a "bloody sweatshirt" and asking him if he knows
anything about it. It would also, to use Aubry and Caputo's exam-
ple, permit the police to show a murder suspect the murder weapon
and point out that there are fingerprints on it." The purpose of the
standard is to prevent the police from conducting a "kangaroo
court"'9 5 with fictitious evidence, rather than to prevent them from
using what evidence they do have in a good faith effort to ascertain
the truth."'
(3) Fictitious Eyewitness
Another technique recommended by Aubry and Caputo is to
attribute a hypothetical story implicating the suspect to a nonexis-
tent eyewitness."' An easier application of the same tactic would be
to assert that there is an eyewitness who saw the suspect commit
the deed in question."' Once again, one might question the effec-
tiveness of such an approach."' The guilty suspect may know for
certain that no one witnessed his crime, or he may recognize the
fictitious nature of the attributed story. If the police have enough
information and evidence to piece together the real story, one must
question the necessity of the confession in obtaining a conviction.2 0
194. A. AuBRY & R. CAPUTo, supra note 161, at 88. The police would not be allowed to
assert that the fingerprints are those of the suspect, however.
195. The "kangaroo court" reference in regard to interrogation is from Kamisar, Brewer
v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is Interrogation? When Does it Matter?, 67 GEO.
L.J. 1, 83 (1978).
196. Once again, the test would be whether a reasonable person would feel that he was
confronted with evidence of his guilt; more specifically, would a reasonable person conclude
that the police were claiming that the prints belonged to him? The reasonable person is
presumed to be innocent. Thus the sensitivities of the guilty suspect would not in any way
contribute to a finding of coercion.
197. See A. AuBRY & R. CAPUro, supra note 161, at 86.
198. Id. at 85.
199. Aubry and Caputo themselves refer to this sort of bluffing as a "weak technique."
Id. at 86.
200. See note 190 supra.
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The innocent suspect is likely to be extremely disturbed by the
eyewitness ploy, especially if he happens to know that eyewitness
mistakes are not uncommon, and that eyewitness testimony is espe-
cially damning at trial. This technique is a particularly frightening
psychological technique from the standpoint of an innocent suspect.
(4) Staged Identification
This technique, in which a phony eyewitness or victim
"identifies" a suspect or even points him out in what appears to be
a legitimate line-up, is basically an elaboration of the fictitious
eyewitness ploy. This Note singles it out for treatment because of
its especially offensive qualities. Inbau and Reid list the staged
identification as a permissible technique, 201 and an earlier police
manual especially recommended the fake line-up technique. 20 2 At
least two reported cases, both of which were decided against the
defendant, have questioned its use. 2 3 The Miranda Court noted the
line-up method in its discussion of coercive interrogation tactics.2 04
The criticisms of the fictitious eyewitness ploy apply to the staged
identification ploy with even greater force. The guilty suspect may
see through the ruse, especially if the "identification" is face-to-
face. The tactic will coerce the more naive guilty suspects because
they may well determine that further resistance to interrogation is
useless. The innocent suspect will conclude that his situation is now
utterly hopeless. The proposed standard would clearly exclude all
manifestations of the staged identification technique.
D. Prevalence of the Tactics
Because of the secrecy surrounding custodial interrogations, it
is impossible to gauge the frequency with which police officers em-
ploy the deceptive tactics discussed above. 25 The police manuals
201. F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note 8, at 196.
202. S. GERBER & 0. SCHROEDER, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND INTERROGATION 369 (1962).
203. People v. McRae, 23 Cim. L. REP. (BNA) 2507 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 17, 1978);
Commonwealth v. Graham, 408 Pa. 155, 182 A.2d 727 (1962).
204. 384 U.S. at 453 (1966). The Court described two variations on the fake identifica-
tion technique. In the first one, the suspect is simply taken out for a line-up and "confidently"
pointed out as the guilty party. Questioning then resumes as if there were no longer any doubt
about the suspect's guilt. In the second variation, the suspect is placed in a line-up and
identified as the culprit in several different offenses, the theory being that the suspect will
become so desperate that he will "confess to the offense under investigation in order to escape
from the false accusations." Id. at 453 (citing C. O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION 105-06 (1956)).
205. The New Haven Study includes some data on the use of the Inbau and Reid
"tactics," but its presentation does not refer specifically to the tactics discussed in this Note.
See New Haven Study, supra note 5, at 1542-49.
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discuss and recommend the tactics, but they provide no measure of
how frequently the police actually employ such tactics.2 8 Because
reported cases207 dealing with each of the tactics do exist, it is likely
that police use deceptive tactics far more often than the cases re-
port. This is so because only a small fraction of interrogated sus-
pects are ultimately convicted and pursue an appeal ending up as
a reported case. Moreover, a basic feature of the criminal justice
system ensures that only a very small percentage of criminal cases
containing a confession appear in the reports: once a suspect has
confessed, he will almost always waive his right to trial and enter
the plea bargaining process,2 08 regardless of how his rights may have
been violated during interrogation.2 1 More importantly, it is fair to
assume that a significant number of persons subjected to deceptive
techniques are innocent of any crime whatsoever, even though cer-
tain police departments may have a policy of interrogating suspects
only when their guilt appears to be relatively certain.2 0 Indeed, it
seems fair to surmise that innocent suspects face trickery more often
than guilty suspects, since the manuals"' warn the detective to use
such tactics only when all other approaches fail.21 2
A recent article in the Nashville Banner suggests that police trickery is a very common
practice in that city. For example, a police sergeant was quoted as saying that deception has
played a part in police interrogations for years. The article focused on the Police Depart-
ment's Legal Advisor, who has recently published an article in a national police publication
strongly advocating the use of trickery in interrogations. Nashville Banner, April 20, 1979, at
1, col. 4.
206. Justice Clark made this point in his Miranda dissent. 384 U.S. at 499.
207. Accomplice confession ploy: e.g., Frazier v. Cupp. 394 U.S. 731 (1969); United
States v. LaVallee, 391 F. Supp. 1150 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); People v. Houston, 36 Ill. App. 3d
695, 344 N.E.2d 641 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Gibson v. Illinois, 429 U.S. 1109 (1977);
People v. Boone, 22 N.Y.2d 476, 239 N.E.2d 885, 293 N.Y.S.2d 287, cert. denied, 393 U.S.
991 (1968).
Physical evidence: e.g., In re D.A.S., 23 CRIm. L. REP. (BNA) 2541 (D.C. Ct. App. Aug.
21, 1978); People v. Pritchett, 23 Ill. App. 3d 368, 319 N.E.2d 101 (1974); State v. White, 146
Mont. 226, 405 P.2d 761 (1965).
Fictitious eyewitness: e.g., People v. Clark, 62 Cal. App. 2d 870, 402 P.2d 856, 44 Cal.
Rptr. 784 (1965).
Fake line-up: People v. McRae, 23 Caim. L. REP. (BNA) 2507 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 17,
1978); Commonwealth v. Graham, 408 Pa. 155, 182 A.2d 727 (1962).
208. See 0. STEPHENS, supra note 5, at 200.
209. A claim that a confession was involuntary cannot ordinarily be raised once a guilty
plea has been entered. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (holding that a
defendant who claims that he pleaded guilty because of a coerced confession is not entitled
to federal habeas corpus relief).
210. For example, the New Haven Police Department rarely arrested anyone without
considerable evidence, and therefore the detectives seldom felt under pressure to obtain
information from suspects. New Haven Study, supra note 5, at 1539.
211. See A. AuBRY & R. CAPuTo, supra note 161, at 86.
212. This assumes that an innocent suspect presumably has not been induced to confess
by other techniques. Of course, the same may be true of a guilty suspect; however, the savvy
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Police trickery raises the fundamental question of whether
American society believes that its police should have the right to
exercise such coercive tactics on its citizens, guilty or innocent. This
Note does not suggest that the courts or legislatures should prohibit
trickery simply because it is occasionally used on suspects who turn
out to be innocent. Trickery's benefits as an effective means of
obtaining confessions, and ultimately convictions, should be
weighed against the costs incurred by the innocent persons some-
times victimized by trickery, as well as against our society's reserva-
tions about granting to the police any coercive powers in excess of
those needed to maintain order. No apparent reason exists to believe
that trickery is a notably effective means of obtaining confessions.
Even Aubry and Caputo admit that subterfuge in general is a weak
technique likely to succeed only with inexperienced criminals. 213
Presumably these are the same suspects who would make state-
ments in the face of lesser coercion, or who have left evidence of
their crime. From a broader perspective, there is little reason to
suspect that the use of trickery significantly contributes to the ulti-
mate goal of obtaining a conviction. For example, in the Yale Law
Journal's New Haven study, the authors concluded that confessions
were necessary in only thirteen percent of the cases observed. 2 14
Given the apparent ineffectiveness of trickery in obtaining confes-
sions, there is little basis for believing that, in the minority of cases
where confessions are necessary, trickery would result in a confes-
sion when all other methods have failed. Little support exists for the
proposition that the use of trickery has resulted in convictions that
could not have been achieved otherwise. In short, trickery does not
appear to be an essential means of pursuing the ends of justice.
VI. REMEDIES
A. Due Process-The Exclusionary Rule
This Note submits that any interrogation technique that falsely
confronts a suspect with evidence of his guilt is a violation of sub-
stantive due process, and any resulting confession therefore must be
excluded from evidence. There are two rationales for this conclu-
sion. The first rationale is essentially the same as that applied in
Rochin v. California,2 15 in which the Supreme Court held that evi-
criminal whose interrogation might require "last resort" tactics will probably refuse to waive
his Miranda rights in the first place.
213. A. Auany & R. CAPUTO, supra note 161, at 79. On the other hand, the authors claim
that on some occasions, subterfuge can work "magnificently." Id. at 85.
214. New Haven Study, supra note 5, at 1585.
215. 342 U.S. 165, 173-74 (1952).
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dence obtained through pumping a suspect's stomach is inadmissi-
ble as a violation of due process. According to the Rochin Court,
certain forms of police misconduct are so offensive that they should
not be tolerated in a civilized society. Judge Curtin in Robinson v.
Smith recently echoed this sentiment in commenting on police
trickery: "[s]uch deception clearly has no place in our system of
justice."21 Although trickery may not be as strikingly offensive as
stomach pumping or torture, the cases that first outlawed those
practices are rather old. There is thus some reason to hope that the
standards of police conduct have risen since then. The second ra-
tionale states simply that such techniques are inherently coercive,
even if the police have not intended to abuse the suspect. The psy-
chological studies that have been done in this area suggest that
confrontation with proof of guilt is a powerful means of inducing a
confession. 218 This Note suggests that when a suspect is confronted
with false evidence of his guilt, the effect is so overwhelming that
the resulting confession is involuntary. Indeed, as a psychological
matter, the confession is involuntary even if the evidence actually
exists. As a legal matter, however, it is absurd for the defendant to
argue that reality has rendered his confession involuntary. 219
To declare a particular form of police behavior a violation of
due process is in large part a moral judgment that ideally reflects
the changing values of a society. The basis for such judgments some-
times may be abstractions that fail to consider adequately the harsh
realities of police work.2 0 Although the law should reflect the de-
mand for higher levels of police conduct, it should not strip the
police of weapons they need in order to be effective in their fight
against crime. Trickery, however, is not an indispensable weapon.
Confessions themselves are of marginal value in obtaining convic-
tions.221 In those cases in which confessions are necessary, the police
manuals themselves suggest that trickery is not a particularly effec-
tive device in obtaining a confession. 222 It is recommended both as
216. Robinson v. Smith, 451 F. Supp. 1278, 1291 (W.D.N.Y. 1978).
217. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), the torture case, is 43 years old; Rochin
was decided in 1952.
218. See notes 7-8 supra and accompanying text.
219. Of course, this is not to deny that there may be circumstances involving no decep-
tion in which the police conduct is so coercive as to render the resulting confession involun-
tary. See, e.g., Annot., 27 A.L.R.3d 1185 (1969) (collecting cases in which confessions of
murder suspects were held involuntary because the suspect was forced to view the victim's
corpse).
220. See F. INhAU & J. REm, supra note 8, at 213-19.
221. See text accompanying note 214 supra.
222. See note 213 supra and accompanying text.
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a technique of last resort,m and as a device that is primarily effec-
tive against the young and inexperienced offender.24 One may ques-
tion how often the interrogation of a young or inexperienced offender
would require a last resort measure. Finally, even if trickery were
shown to be appreciably effective in obtaining confessions from the
guilty without undue coercion, the courts must recognize the inter-
ests of the innocent suspect who finds himself taken in for question-
ing. Such techniques could have a shattering effect on the innocent
suspect. His situation is already grim, and he may see no readily
apparent way out of it. His only hope lies in the knowledge of his
innocence. The confrontation with "proof" of his guilt, however,
may destroy even that vestige of security. Under those circum-
stances, he may conclude that he is destined to become another
victim in the tragic history of justice's mistakes. This Note submits
that this form of mental torture inflicted upon the innocent out-
weighs any possible incremental effect that trickery may have on
effective law enforcement. Thus this Note maintains that the courts
should ban trickery as an interrogation tactic by holding it a viola-
tion of substantive due process. 228
Such a holding would mean that confessions induced by trick-
ery would be inadmissible against the defendant at trial. This Note
proposes a very straightforward procedure for determining admissi-
bility: if the defendant comes forward with evidence that the police
tricked him, the state must refute these assertions and prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary.2? The threat
of the defendant's perjury is not a serious fear because the police will
probably win swearing matches over such matters. 228 The substan-
tive test can be stated as follows: Was the misrepresentation of such
a nature that a reasonable person could believe that the police had
223. See text accompanying note 183 supra.
224. Id.
225. This is not to suggest that the innocent suspect will actually make a false confes-
sion in these circumstances, although that is a possibility.
226. This argument is a part of the police misconduct (Rochin) rationale presented in
text accompanying notes 215-16 supra; it is not a separate rationale.
227. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (holding that the question of a confession's
admissibility must be decided by the judge prior to trial), provides the context for the hearing
contemplated by this procedure. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972), held that a confession
is constitutionally admissible if the prosecution proves by a preponderance of the evidence
that the confession was voluntary. Many jurisdictions have gone beyond the Supreme Court
and require the prosecution to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. E.g., People
v. Jimenez, 21 Cal. 3d 595, 580 P.2d 672, 147 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1978); 3urton v. State, 260 Ind.
94, 292 N.E.2d 790 (1973); State v. Peters, 315 So. 2d 678 (La. 1975); State v. Phinney, 370
A.2d 1153 (N.H. 1977); State v. Washington, 135 N.J. Super. 23, 342 A.2d 559 (1975); see
Lederer, The Law of Confessions-The Voluntariness Doctrine, 74 MI.. L.J. 67, 90 (1976).
228. See CanmiNAL PROCEDURE, supra note 13, at 513.
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evidence that could be used against him, even though such evidence
would necessarily be contrived. The reasonable person is presumed
to be innocent. This presumption prevents any problems that might
arise because of guilty suspects' extreme sensitivities about the
presence or absence of evidence. 2 29 This objective test does not re-
quire any demonstrated causal connection between the trickery and
the statement.230 The standard avoids the subjective inquiries that
made the old due process voluntariness standard unworkable be-
cause it simply declares certain forms of conduct violative of due
process regardless of their subjective impact on the suspect.23 The
remedy may seem harsh when there is reason to believe that the
trickery did not in fact have any effect on the particular defendant's
decision to confess, but it is no harsher than the rule requiring
exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence, regardless of the
officer's good faith, or than the Miranda rule that all confessions
obtained without the Miranda warnings are inadmissible, regardless
of the circumstances. It is unfortunate that this objective standard
might someday allow a guilty person to go free simply because "the
constable has blundered." The broader societal interests at stake,
however, outweigh the revulsion towards isolated instances of crimi-
nals benefitting, perhaps unduly, from modern notions of criminal
procedure designed to protect the innocent.
B. Recovery in Tort for the Infliction of Mental Distress
Although the exclusion of confessions obtained by trickery
would presumably deter the police from employing such methods, 2
it is painfully obvious that the only direct beneficiaries of the exclu-
sionary rule would be the relatively small number of guilty suspects
brought to trial who would seek to have their confessions sup-
pressed. This remedy is of little comfort to the innocent suspect
victimized by willful police deception when the police have not been
deterred by the exclusionary rule.ss The law currently provides no
229. See, notes 185-187 supra and accompanying text (discussing a guilty suspect's
particular susceptibility to the "intimation" that his accomplice has confessed).
230. In attempting to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was volun-
tary, the prosecution would be allowed to show that there was in fact no causal connection
between the trickery and the confession. If this can be shown beyond a reasonable doubt, the
confession should be found voluntary.
231. See, Judge Weinstein's approach to the voluntariness of guilty pleas in United
States v. Mancusi, 275 F. Supp. 508, 516 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) (objective test for determining
voluntariness of guilty, plea applied without regard to whether the defendant was
"subjectively overwhelmed" by acts of official impropriety). See note 96 supra.
232. Weisberg points out that there are several unanswered questions regarding the
effectiveness of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent. Weisberg, supra note 157, at 176-77.
233. Justice Harlan expressed this idea in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403
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protection to the victim of such practices? 4 This Note suggests that
a victim of police trickery who suffers emotional distress as a result
of reckless police misconduct should be able to recover for his dam-
ages. The Restatement (Second) of Torts sets out essentially three
elements for the tort of outrageous conduct causing severe emotional
distress: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intentionally or
reckless causing, (3) severe emotional distress?. A suit to recover
for emotional distress caused by a police officer's attempt to con-
front a suspect with "proof" of his guilt could meet all three require-
ments.
An unfounded accusation of criminal behavior, much less a
confrontation with evidence of guilt, can constitute extreme and
outrageous conduct for purposes of this tort. Indeed, accusations of
bad conduct, short of criminal, have given rise to successful suits
for damages based upon the resulting emotional distress. For exam-
ple, in a 1926 Minnesota case26 school authorities confronted the
plaintiff, a high school girl, with accusations that she had engaged
in immoral sexual conduct. The authorities interrogated her at
length, threatening her with prisonm7 and disgrace unless she con-
fessed. After finally "confessing" despite her innocence, the girl
suffered a mental disturbance that resulted in physical illness. The
court allowed her to recover for her damages? 5 Although the defen-
dant's conduct in that earlier case was outrageous for a number of
reasons,m' the false accusations of immoral conduct were obviously
an important element.
A 1919 English case is perhaps even more on point for purposes
of this Note. In that case, Janvier v. Sweeney,w0 a private detective
U.S. 388, 398 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). Bivens had sued in tort for damages sustained
by him as a result of an illegal search. The Government argued that Bivens was adequately
protected by the exclusionary rule. Justice Harlan observed that "assuming Bivens' inno-
cence of the crime charged, the 'exclusionary rule' is simply irrelevant. For people in Bivens'
shoes, it is damages or nothing." Id. at 410.
234. See Weisberg, supra note 157, at 166.
235. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 46 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
Section 46 states in full:
§ 46. Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emo-
tional distress, and if bodily harm results from it, for such bodily harm.
236. Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926).
237. Despite the threats of prison, there was no indication that the plaintiff was accused
of any conduct that could actually lead to incarceration.
238. 167 Minn. at 207-08, 208 N.W. at 816.
239. The case also involved a statute prohibiting words that impaired the reputation
of a female. Id. at 207, 208 N.W. at 816.
240. [1919] 2 K.B. 316.
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falsely told the plaintiff, a resident alien, that he was a policeman
and that he would charge her with espionage unless she gave him
certain letters that he was seeking. The court allowed the plaintiff
to recover for her resulting emotional disturbance and serious ill-
ness.
In 1974, the Virginia Supreme Court held in Womack v.
Eldridge2 11 that the plaintiff stated a cause of action against a pho-
tographer who had taken photographs of the plaintiff for use in a
child-molesting case. An attorney representing a criminal defen-
dant, Seifert, in the child-molesting case employed Eldridge to ob-
tain photographs of Womack to be used in the trial of Seifert."2
Eldridge obtained the photographs by falsely telling Womack that
she wished to photograph him in connection with an upcoming
newspaper story about Womack's roller rink. At trial the defense
attorney showed the two victims the photograph of Womack and
asked if he had molested them. The boys replied negatively. The
prosecutor then asked for the photographs and for information con-
cerning Womack. Womack subsequently was called as a witness at
the trial where he was asked if he had molested any children. A
police officer questioned Womack several times afterwards. Wom-
ack then sued Eldridge, alleging that, as a result of the investiga-
tions resulting from the photographs, he had suffered great shock
and distress.243 The court's primary holding was that a cause of
action would lie for emotional distress unaccompanied by physical
injury. 244 The court further held, however, that the jury could decide
the question whether the defendant photographer's conduct had
been extreme and outrageous. 245 The court stated that "a reasonable
person would or should have recognized the likelihood of the serious
mental distress that would be caused in involving an innocent per-
son in child molesting cases." 246
Thus, Womack illustrates the point that false accusations of
guilt may constitute extreme and outrageous conduct, depending to
some extent upon the nature of the crime in question and the plain-
tiff's public exposure. Indeed, the photographer's misconduct in
Womack did not really amount to an accusation of guilt; she merely
helped to implicate Womack in a criminal proceeding. The plain-
tiff's indisputable innocence in Womack clearly contributed to the
241. 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d 145 (1974).
242. The only excuse given for seeking the photographs was Womack's presence at the
time and place of Seifert's arrest.
243. 215 Va. at 338-40, 210 S.E.2d at 146-47.
244. Id. at 342, 210 S.E.2d at 148.
245. Id.
246. Id.
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court's finding that the defendant's conduct was sufficiently outra-
geous to present a jury question. That innocence, however, in no
way detracts from the basic proposition that accusations of criminal
conduct may be extreme and outrageous for the purposes of the tort.
It simply means that the clearly innocent plaintiff will have a
greater chance of sending his case to the jury.47
Because it is clear that an unfounded accusation of criminal
conduct can be sufficiently extreme and outrageous to cause emo-
tional distress, 248 false confrontations with actual evidence of guilt,
being even more outrageous, would even more clearly satisfy the
"extreme and outrageous conduct" requirement of this tort.
In addition to showing "extreme and outrageous" police con-
duct, the plaintiff seeking damages for emotional distress must
show that the police acted intentionally or recklessly. Comment i to
Section Forty-Six of the Restatement, providing for tort recovery for
outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress, states that
the section applies not only when the actor desires to inflict severe
emotional distress, but also when he knows that such distress is
certain, or substantially certain, to result from his conduct.", The
section also applies when the actor acts recklessly, in deliberate
disregard of the high probability that emotional distress will result
from his actions.5 0 Although the entire process of interrogation ar-
guably can be viewed as a deliberate attempt to inflict emotional
distress on the subject,2' it is not necessary to analyze the use of
trickery as an intentional tortious act because the Restatement
allows liability for reckless behavior causing mental distress.
The Restatement provides that conduct is reckless when the
actor knows or has reason to know of facts that would lead a reason-
able man to realize that such conduct creates an unreasonable risk
of harm. 252 There are two basic types of reckless conduct: (1) the
actor knows or has reason to know23 of facts that create a high risk
of harm to another, and deliberately proceeds to act in disregard of,
247. In theory, a suspect found guilty of the crime in question could bring this cause of
action, but the improbability of recovering any damages for alleged mental distress suffered
in those circumstances suggests that a convicted defendant would rarely if ever bring such a
suit.
248. Accusations of dishonesty by a creditor may constitute outrageous conduct for the
purposes of the tort. See W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF Tomrs § 12 (4th ed. 1971).
249. RESTATEMENT, supra note 235, § 46, Comment i.
250. Id.
251. Aubry and Caputo acknowledge that "[i]nterrogation creates anxiety, nervous
tension, and a state of mental aggravation in the subject." A. AuBRY & R. CAPUTO, supra note
161, at 123.
252. RESTATEMENT, supra note 235, § 500.
253. The phrase "reason to know" is defined in § 12 of the Restatement.
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or indifference to, that risk; and (2) the actor has such knowledge,
or reason to know, of the facts, but does not realize the high degree
of risk involved, although a reasonable person in his position
would.2" The latter is an "objective standard" under which the
actor is "held to the realization of the aggravated risks" 66 that a
reasonable person would entertain, even though subjectively the
actor does not apprehend the risk. It would appear that unfounded
confrontations with evidence of guilt could often be classified as
recklessness of the latter type. Reasonable people would know that
serious accusations of guilt create significant risks of causing mental
distress to a person, and the actor who makes such an unfounded
accusation is reckless, whether or not he is aware of those risks.25,
A 1954 case, Savage v. Boies,m" serves as an example of liability
for the reckless infliction of emotional distress. The defendants in
that case were two sheriff's deputies who were under orders to detain
the plaintiff for civil commitment proceedings. In order to accom-
plish this, the deputies located the plaintiff and told her that her
husband and baby had been critically injured in a car accident, and
invited her to accompany them to the hospital. Upon finding out
that the whole story was a ruse designed to get her into custody, the
plaintiff suffered severe distress.258 The court held that a jury could
find that "emotional distress is substantially certain to follow from
such conduct,""'9 and that the plaintiff could recover damages for
it.2"" Thus, if this sort of conduct is "substantially certain" to cause
mental distress, then a false confrontation with evidence of guilt
should also be deemed reckless, if not indeed intentional, miscon-
duct.
That an unfounded accusation of criminal behavior may be
reckless seems indisputable. The Restatement,261 however, contains
a limitation that may apply in deciding whether such an accusation
in a police interrogation is reckless. The comments state that "the
254. RESTATEMFNT, supra note 235, § 500, Comment a.
255. Id.
256. Comment f of section 500, distinguishing intentional misconduct and recklessness,
also contains useful language regarding the reckless state of mind as defined by the Restate-
ment:
While an act to be reckless must be intended by the actor, the actor does not intend to
cause the harm which results from it. It is enough that he realizes or, from facts which
he knows, should realize that there is a strong probability that harm may result, even
though he hopes or even expects that his conduct will prove harmless.
257. 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349 (1954).
258. Id. at 356-57, 272 P.2d at 350-51.
259. Id. at 358, 272 P.2d at 351.
260. Id., 272 P.2d at 351.
261. RESTATEMFNT, supra note 235, § 500, Comment a.
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risk [of harm] must itself be an unreasonable one under the cir-
cumstances. There may be exceptional circumstances which make
it reasonable to adopt a course of conduct which involves a high
degree of risk of harm to others." 26 2 One might argue that interroga-
tion of a suspect is one of these exceptional circumstances justifying
the risk of otherwise reckless behavior. 263
Finally, the plaintiff seeking damages for emotional distress
must show "severe" emotional distress. The Restatement sets forth
this requirement: the distress must have in fact resulted, and it
must be severe. The term includes "all highly unpleasant mental
reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embar-
rassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry and nausea.""' It
is obvious that a criminal accusation could result in most of these
reactions, even to the extreme degree required by the Restatement.
Although the plaintiff would be denied recovery if he had not ac-
tually suffered the harm, such a determination is for the jury, once
the court decides that, on the evidence, a finding of severe emotional
distress is possible. 265 Thus, review of the elements constituting a
successful claim for damages for emotional distress reveals that
such a claim would provide a remedy for persons recklessly accused
of criminal conduct.
Because reckless accusation of criminal conduct can give rise
to a cause of action for outrageous conduct causing severe emotional
distress, false confrontation with evidence of one's guilt should also
give rise to such a cause of action. Thus, if A falsely tells B that he,
A, has documented evidence that B has been embezzling from a
bank, B may recover for his emotional distress thereby induced.2 6
The question that must be posed, however, is whether it makes any
difference if A happens to be a policeman who is interrogating B
about a crime. More generally, the question is whether a policeman
is privileged to trick a suspect undergoing interrogation into believ-
ing that there is incriminating evidence against him. If the police-
man were merely a private citizen, it is clear that such conduct
would be tortious. Our society, however, grants its police privi-
leges 27 to perform acts that would be tortious if a private person
262. Id.
263. There may be extreme circumstances that justify the use of trickery. For example,
consider a case in which the victim's life may be in danger unless a confession is obtained
quickly.
264. RESTATEMENT, supra note 235, § 46, Comment j.
265. Id.
266. Assuming, of course, that B can prove all the elements of the tort. See note 235
supra and accompanying text.
267. A privilege in tort law allows the actor to avoid liability for tortious conduct under
1979] 1207
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
were the actor. A policeman's privilege to make arrests268 is the most
common example of a tort privilege granted the police. A police
officer is privileged to make an arrest upon an invalid warrant, so
long as it is fair upon its face.' Although every citizen has a legal
privilege to make warrantless arrests under certain circumstances,
a policeman's privilege in this context is much broader.27 0 The policy
reason for the policeman's protection is obvious: because the mak-
ing of arrests is an important societal interest, those whose primary
responsibility it is to make such arrests should not be deterred from
the diligent execution of their duties by the fear of tort liability. A
policeman's arrest privilege is closely related to the existence of
custodial interrogation, in that custodial interrogation requires an
arrest. 271 Indeed, an officer may arrest somebody for the primary
purpose of conducting a custodial interrogation, without any fear of
tort liability. 27 2
This Note submits that there is also a police privilege to con-
duct interrogation that is analytically distinguishable from the priv-
ilege to make arrests. The privilege273 provides that it is not tortious
for the police to question people in a manner that could be tortious
if a private citizen were in an analogous position. 24 The privilege
allows the police to inquire about highly personal matters in a man-
ner that might otherwise be viewed as a tortious invasion of pri-
vacy.27 5 It also permits the police to falsely accuse citizens of crimes,
a practice that, under other circumstances, might be treated as
circumstances that make it just and reasonable that liability not be imposed. A privilege
defeats the existence of the tort itself. For a general discussion of privilege, see W. PROSSER,
supra note 248, at 970.
268. The meaning of "arrest" in this context is limited to its tort law definition. Prosser
describes the legal restraint that qualifies as an arrest by a police officer as follows: "The
restraint upon the plaintiffs freedom may also be imposed by the assertion of legal authority.
If the plaintiff submits or if there is even a momentary taking into the custody of the law,
there is an arrest . . . ." Id. § 11 (footnotes omitted).
269. K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 26.03 (1958).
270. See W. PROSSER, supra note 248, § 26.
271. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977), clearly implies that "custodial interro-
gation" requires at least the restraint that would qualify as an arrest for tort law purposes,
even though the suspect is not arrested in the sense that he is to be charged with any crime.
See generally note 268 supra.
272. This assumes that the conditions required for the existence of the privilege are
present, even though the officer may not intend to charge the suspect with a crime. See W.
PROSSER, supra note 248, § 26.
273. The requirements of Miranda are irrelevant in relation to this privilege; the fact
that an officer has not complied with Miranda does not dissolve his tort privilege.
274. See, e.g., Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926) (imposing
liability on school officials for conduct in a situation resembling an interrogation).
275. More specifically, such inquiries might otherwise be viewed as intrusions upon
seclusion. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 235, § 652B (1977).
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intentional infliction of mental distress. The privilege is broad; its
rationale is to ensure that the police are free to make effective use
of interrogation. The privilege is not unlimited, however.
The privilege to make an arrest carries with it "the privilege of
using all reasonable force to effect it,"276 assuming that the arrest is
lawful. The reasonable force privilege, although permissive, also
sets limits on the manner in which arrest may be effected. 27 1 In much
the same way, the privilege to conduct interrogations should contain
a "reasonable force" limitation, which one might refer to as the
"tolerable pressure" privilege. The reasonable force privilege strikes
a balance in favor of the preservation of life and limb, as against the
state's interest in apprehending fleeing criminals. The tolerable
pressure privilege would strike a balance in favor of human dignity
over the state's interest in extracting a confession, an interest whose
value has been widely questioned anyway. 278 The direct beneficiaries
of the standard would be the innocent suspects who presently have
little if any protection against police abuse during interrogation.27 1
This proposed privilege would necessarily imply that any con-
duct in excess of that allowed by the privilege is tortious. 211 As in
the case of the reasonable force privilege,"' whether the pressure
applied is excessive would be a question of fact. The relevant fac-
tors would include the seriousness of the crime, the apparent cer-
tainty of the suspect's guilt at the time of interrogation, the need
for a confession, for example, was a confession necessary in order to
help prevent further loss of life or property, and the defendant's
prior experience with the police. A "silent factor," and perhaps the
most important consideration, is whether the defendant was con-
victed of the crime in question. The factor is "silent" because pre-
sumably few suspects who have been convicted of the crime in ques-
tion would venture to persuade a jury that they were tort victims
who should receive considerable damages, and thus this factor
would ordinarily not be visible. The tort remedy is designed primar-
ily to benefit the innocent; the guilty can find solace in the exclu-
sionary rule.
276. W. PROSSER, supra note 248, § 26.
277. Generally speaking, the type of crime determines the amount of force that can be
used; for example, an officer may use more force in arresting a violent felon than in arresting
a misdemeanant. Id.
278. See, e.g., Weisberg, supra note 157, at 181.
279. In extreme cases involving a significant restraint on liberty, a citizen may have a
cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). See Kerr v. City of Chicago, 424 F.2d 1134(7th Cir. 1970); 20 DE PAUL L. REV. 984 (1971).
280. If the plaintiff in fact suffered severe mental distress. See text accompanying notes
264-65 supra.
281. W. PROSSER, supra note 248, § 26, at 134.
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Tort liability based on conduct that exceeds the tolerable pres-
sure privilege would not deter effective interrogation. Tortious con-
duct occurs only when the police act in an extreme and outrageous
manner.282 Any argument that the privilege should extend to all
police conduct" during interrogation in order not to chill police
work is countered by the consideration that abuse of police power
is particularly extreme and outrageous precisely because of the po-
liceman's power over his victim.21 The Supreme Court recognized
this point in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents."' In Bivens the
court indicated that, because of a government agent's power, the
relationship between a citizen and a government agent who has
harmed him286 is much different from the relationship between two
private citizens in an analogous situation. In the Court's words,
"[a]n agent acting-albeit unconstitutionally-in the name of the
United States possesses a far greater capacity for harm than an
individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his own."'
The Bivens Court went on to hold that the fourth amendment viola-
tion at issue gave rise to a federal cause of action for damages. In
the present context, however, the Court's rationale supports the
proposition that the abuse of police authority, because of its unique
capacity for harm, is a factor that weighs heavily in favor of limiting
the policeman's privilege. Police privileges have been created in
order to protect legitimate societal interests. The legitimate inter-
ests in custodial interrogation should not, however, grant the police
a license to conduct themselves in an outrageous manner that would
be extremely tortious under any other circumstances. At some
point, individual human dignity outweighs the law enforcement in-
terest in aggressive interrogation; at some point society's hired in-
terrogator becomes an individual tortfeasor. Tactics that falsely
confront a person with proof of his guilt go beyond that point. Inter-
rogation by itself, including perhaps direct accusation of guilt, is
frightening enough, but at least the innocent person retains some
faith that the confusion will soon disperse. His greatest hope lies in
the lack of any evidence against him. But when the police confront
him with "proof," they shatter his hope. Most people, fortunately,
282. This Note assumes that the infliction of severe emotional distress would ordinarily
be the basis of tort liability. See generally note 235 supra.
283. Of course, no privilege protects the police from liability for assault and battery that
occurs during an interrogation.
284. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 235, § 46, Comment e.
285. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
286. Bivens sued six Federal Bureau of Narcotics agents in tort for the emotional dis-
tress he suffered in an allegedly unlawful search of his home. Id. at 389-90.
287. 403 U.S. at 392.
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can only imagine the psychological devastation experienced by a
person in that situation.
Thus, this Note maintains that police trickery may give rise to
a cause of action for outrageous conduct causing severe emotional
distress. The common law tradition would impose the burden of
liability on the individual officer; that tradition "has been that a
police officer is subjected to a liability as if he was a private individ-
ual,""' while the governmental unit is immune. More particularly,
it is clear that a police officer can be held liable for the infliction of
severe emotional distress in the course of his duties."' This Note,
however, adopts the position of Professor Kenneth Davis that the
governmental unit should be liable for the torts of its police offi-
cers. 290
Davis argues that personal liability, because it is "sporadically
imposed" and often lags years behind the abuse, does not deter the
police from misconduct.2 ' Moreover, plaintiffs may be dissuaded
from such lawsuits by the simple reason that individual policemen
are unlikely to be financially responsible.12 Davis observes that po-
lice abuses thrive under the present system that theoretically holds
police officers liable for their torts. In order to deter police abuses
there must be incentives for the top officials of a department to
crack down on misconduct that threatens the loss of departmental
funds. Policemen will respond to the dictates of their superiors be-
cause the enforcement in this context will be "steady, swift, and
sure;" personal liability, on the other hand, is a "hit-or-miss" treat-
ment of the symptoms.2 3
A system of governmental liability would also respond to the
fears of those who believe that individual tort liability, despite its
infrequency,2 ' is too strong of a deterrent, because the threat of
personal liability may lead a policeman to restrain himself exces-
sively to the detriment of the public's interest in law enforcement.115
The threat of departmental sanctions is a much better deterrent
because its "swiftness and sureness" assure a level of general observ-
288. K. DAVIs, supra note 269, § 26.03; see RESTATEMENr, supra note 235, § 895D (1979).
289. E.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Savage v. Boies,
77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349 (1954). In fact, section 46 of the Restatement contains an illustra-
tion of a police officer's liability for the tort. REsrATEMEwr, supra note 235, § 46, Comment
k, Illustration 19.
290. K. DAvis, supra note 269, § 26.03.
291. Id.
292. Id. § 26.02.
293. Id. § 26.03.
294. Tort suits against individual policemen are increasingly popular, however. See
Schmidt, Recent Trends in Police Tort Litigation, 8 Uns. LAw. 682 (1976).
295. See K. DAVIS, supra note 269, § 26.03 at 522.
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ance, while the absence of any threat of devastating economic loss
ensures' that the individual policeman will not be unduly chilled
in the exercise of his duties. This Note acknowledges that the wide-
spread recognition of this type of governmental liability for the com-
mon law torts of police officers may be some distance in the future.2 17
The immunity of municipalities, however, has been eroding for
some time.2 9 Thus it is not unrealistic to expect such liability to
develop.
Finally, a word should be said about the measure of damages.
Assessing damages for tortious conduct during an interrogation is
somewhat difficult because a suspect is likely to be very distressed
even by a perfectly lawful interrogation. In other words, it is difficult
for a plaintiff to show how much of his distress was caused by the
tortious aspects of his interrogation. Although such damages ob-
viously could not be measured with absolute precision, juries make
equally difficult decisions every day. In a trickery case, the plain-
tiff's testimony and cross-examination should demonstrate to some
degree his emotional condition prior to and following the trickery.
Furthermore, punitive damages may be based on the outrageous-
ness of the defendant's conduct, with little regard to the measure
of the plaintiffs actual injuries.299 Punitive damages are critical in
this context because they should provide the bulk of whatever deter-
rent effect tort liability will have, as well as the bulk of the plain-
tiff's recovery.
296. In an extreme case the officer may suffer severe economic injury by losing his job.
297. Prosser states that such liability will probably never be generally accepted. W.
PROSSER, supra note 248, § 132.
298. See id. § 131, at 984-86. Although it was based on statutory grounds, the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), holding
that local governments are not immune from suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is a dramatic
example of the erosion of municipal immunity. The Monell Court emphasized, however, that
the muncipality's liability must be based on some municipal policy in violation of the statute;
the Court explicitly rejected any notion that liability could be based on respondeat superior.
For example, the city is not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 simply because one of its officers
violates the statute; the violation must be pursuant to some municipal policy in order for the
municipality to sustain liability. Id. at 691-95.
299. W. PROSSER, supra note 248, § 2. Punitive damages are not ordinarily assessed
against municipalities. Id. n.91. However, if tort law is to provide a deterrent to police
misconduct, the better policy is to assess punitive damages against the municipality. See text
accompanying notes 288-96 supra. This is especially true because the governmental unit is
in a position to exert great control over its officers' conduct. The majority of courts follow
this approach in regard to the liability of a private corporation for punitive damages resulting
from acts of its employees in the scope of employment. See W. PROSSER, supra note 248, § 2,
at 12.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In sum, Miranda has not been successful in curbing psychologi-
cally coercive police interrogation because very few suspects are
prepared to assert their Miranda rights, and Miranda asserts no
control whatsoever over the interrogation following a waiver.
Mincey v. Arizona, however, suggests the due process clause as a
vehicle for controlling abusive police practices. The problem with
the old due process voluntariness standard was its subjectivity; thus
this Note proposes an objective standard. Police trickery, defined as
any technique that affirmatively confronts a suspect with false evi-
dence of his guilt, is a violation of this standard, because it is inher-
ently coercive, and because of the high risks that it will be used
against innocent suspects. The prohibition of trickery on due pro-
cess grounds, and the resulting application of the exclusionary rule,
are further justified by the lack of any reason to believe that trickery
is a significantly effective tool in the arsenal of criminal investiga-
tion. Finally, this Note submits that in extreme cases of intentional
trickery, the victim should be able to recover in tort for the infliction
of mental distress. The better policy is for the governmental unit,
not the individual policeman, to bear the burden of liability.
Prosser, in referring to the development of recovery for mental
distress in tort, writes that the law is in a process of evolution "the
ultimate limits of which cannot as yet be determined." 00 This Note
submits that recovery for mental distress caused by police trickery
is not beyond those "ultimate limits;" rather, as Prosser states, "it
is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it."3'" In
both criminal procedure and tort law, police trickery is a wrong that
deserves it.
JAMEs G. THoMAs
300. W. PROSSER, supra note 248, § 12, at 50.
301. Id. at 51.
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